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This study traces Czechoslovak-Polish political and economic
relations from the foundations of the two Eastern European states
in 1918 through the 1968 Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of
Czechoslovakia, in which Poland acted as a leading participant.
The study relies heavily upon Czech, Polish, French and English
sources, and the majority of the research material was gathered in
Eastern Europe from 1973 to 1975*
The study surveys the lengthy history of mutual Czech-Polish
cultural prejudice, animosity, and indifference.
Because of these
factors, the Czechs and the Poles, two of Eastern Europe's most
powerful and influential nations, have never been able to form a
common bloc to prevent Soviet domination of their respective
states.
One conclusion of the study reveals that the Soviet Union
has been able to maintain her hegemony in Czechoslovakia and in
Poland not only because of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon, but also
because of the aforementioned mutual Czech-Polish cultural preju
dice, animosity, and indifference.
The purpose of the study is to examine the propensity for revolt
in Eastern Europe since 1953*
Because the conservative Eastern
European Communist regimes have consistently proven to be
unwilling to honor popular demands for increased freedom of expres
sion and an improved standard of living, revolt appears to be the
only means available to the Eastern European peoples to democratize
the Communist.system of government,. Since the 1975 Helsinki
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, dissidents
demanding that the Eastern European regimes honor their human rights
commitments have appeared throughout Eastern Europe.
The political
and economic situation in Poland is especially critical, and a
potential Polish insurrection could erupt at any time.
If a
Polish insurrection were to occur, however improbable given the
widespread fear throughout Eastern. Europe of Soviet military inter
vention to suppress any revolts, the prospects that the politically
discontented Czechs would rise up in revolt in mutual support, of
the Poles appear to be negligible.
This conclusion is based upon
an analysis of negative factors in the Czech-Polish past.
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P R E F A C E

Traditional American study of Eastern Europe focuses pri
marily upon the unwillingness of several Eastern European states to
obey unswervingly the Soviet Union's dictates.

These studies tend

to examine the antagonism which exists throughout Eastern Europe
vis-ci-vis the Soviet Union.
However, few American scholars of Eastern European affairs
have examined the conflicts and mutual negative attitudes of the
Eastern European peoples.

It is the purpose of this thesis to exa

mine the mutual negative attitudes of the Czechs and the Poles, two
of Eastern E u r o p e 's most powerful and influential nations.
From October, 1973, to June, 1975, I researched CzechoslovakPolish relations as a Fulbright-Hays scholar at Adam Mickiewicz
University in Poznan, Poland, under the guidance of Professor Antoni
Czubinski.

The majority of the research sources utilized in this

thesis was gathered in Poland and in Czechoslovakia.

Other European

as well as American sources constitute the remainder of the research
material.
Prior to my departure for Poland in September, 1973, I was
vaguely aware of the negative attitudes which exist between the Czechs
and the Poles.

Two years of study in Eastern Europe contributed to

an understanding of the intensity of the antagonisms betv/een the two
Slavic nations.

Valuable insights into Czech and Polish attitudes

wdre obtained not only through research, but also through numerous
conversations with many Polish citizens.

The Polish disdain for the

Czechs was very strong.

Furthermore, a month's stay in Czecho

slovakia in January, 1 9 7 5 i revealed that many Czechs have not yet
forgiven the Poles for their armed takeover of the Teschen coal
region in 1958!.

Likewise, the 1968 Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion

of Czechoslovakia, in which Poland acted as a leading participant,
has remained a bitter topic of Czech discussion.
The intensity of the mutual negative attitudes and distaste
of the Czechs and the Poles appalled me.
of that reaction.

This thesis is the result

C H A P T E R

I

INTRODUCTION
The Case for Mutual Support of Revolt in Eastern Europe
Since the Soviet Union's imposition of Communism in Eastern
Europe after the end of the Second World War, the Eastern European
peoples have periodically risen in revolt against the Communist
regimes which have usurped national freedoms and wish to remain
in power at any cost.

The Eastern European Communist regimes have

maintained their power base through the use of a strong police
system as well as through the extensive influence of the Communist
party in all levels of Eastern European society.
However, despite the strong Communist pplice network as well
as the extensive influence of the Communist party in the Eastern
European states, periodic popular revolts have occurred in Eastern
Europe to demand from the Communist elites in power greater politi
cal or economic freedom.

On three occasions (Poland in 1956, Hungary

in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1 9 6 8 ), Communists themselves insti
tuted reforms of the system in support of popular demands for
increased freedom and national self-determination to conduct internal
political and economic affairs without the outside interference of
the Soviet Union.
The other revolts, provoked by either political or economic
catalysts, include the following:

the 1953 uprising in East Berlin,

and the 1953 workers' riots in Plzeft, Czechoslovakia;

the 1968 Polish

student riots; the 1970 and 1976 Polish workers' riots; and the most
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recent East German demands for personal liberties guaranteed in the
1975 Helsinki Declaration.

As long as freedom remains suppressed

throughout Eastern Europe, the probability of further revolt to
demand increased personal liberty and greater national self-deter
mination will also remain.
Therefore, one can assume that initial revolt in one state
in Eastern Europe could act as a catalyst to provoke the people of
another Eastern European

state to revolt.

Mutual support in the

case of revolt would cause tremendous consternation not only for
the ruling Communist elites in the two states involved in the revolt,
but. also for the Soviet. Union
recalcitrant satellites.

which would have to contend with two

Mutual support in the case of revolt could

possibly lead to greater success in achieving the revolts' objectives,
e. g . , the granting of greater freedom or the overthrow of the
Communists elites in power, who may be perceived as agents of the
Soviet Union.
However, such a revolt would most likely not be opposed to
the idea of socialism.

This assumption is based on a July, 1976,

Radio Free Europe survey, The Best Government, which was conducted
among Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Polish tourists in the West.

The

RFE survey indicated that the current Communist regimes in power in
Czechoslovakia (Husak), Hungary (Kcfdar) , and Poland (Gierek) were
popular among only 3 to 7 percent of those interviewed.

Classical

democracy was popular among 24 to 33 percent of those interviewed,
while democratic socialism as practiced in Austria and in Sweden
received a plurality of 40 to 44 percent.

According to EFE, the
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attraction of democratic socialism will continue to increase among
the youth in the three states, while the attraction of classical
democracy will correspondingly continue to decrease because those
who favored it were older persons who had actually experienced it."*"
It appears as if the Eastern Europeans would prefer to retain some
of the more positive social benefits of Communism such as free
university education, extensive maternity benefits, and a compre
hensive national health care program, but would discard the
extensive Communist police network as well as one-party rule.
Consequently, what
support in Eastern Europe,

is the probability ofa revolt of mutual
in particular between the peoples of

Czechoslovakia and Poland, two of the most important states among
the Soviet Union's satellites
to assume that the peoples

in Eastern Europe?

Is it reasonable

of these two states would give their

mutual support in the case of an initial revolt against the Commu
nist regime in one of the states to demand greater internal
freedom and increased national sovereignty?

Could the Czechs and

the Poles stand together for their mutual benefit to demand the end
of Communist oppression in their respective countries and to
request the Soviet Union to grant them greater national selfdetermination in the running of their internal political and economic
affairs?
The Question of Czech Support for a Potential Polish Insurrection
In this section,.the current events of Poland and Czechoslo
vakia are discussed, and the possibility of potential insurrection
in Poland is revealed.

Can one assume that a revolt in Poland could

act as a catalyst among the politically discontented Czechs to
revolt against their own Communist regime in support of the Poles?
In June, 1976, Polish workers rioted near Warsaw and Radom,
Poland, to protest the Gierek government's decision to raise food
prices which the government had previously held stable since 1 9 7 0 .
Those June riots could possibly indicate that the popular Edward
Gierek, First Secretary of the United Polish Workers'

(Communist)

Party since his coming to power in December, 1970, as a result of
food riots in four Polish cities (Gdansk, Gdynia, Szczecin, and
Ebl§.g) , may be losing his popularity among the Polish people.

The

critical meat shortage and the most recent sugar shortage in Poland
are national scandals and the subjects of much popular complaint
and criticism.

The current Polish situation appears to be

especially critical.
According to a Polish friend of Jean-Fram;ois Revel, a
F r e n c h 'political writer for the journal L'Express, the Gierek
regime does not have either a viable economic or political solution
for Poland's economic problems.

The Pole felt that the Polish

population could erupt at any time in the foreseeable future into
nationwide strikes and demonstrations which could lead to open
insurrection.

Furthermore, the Pole believed that the Polish army

could and would vigorously defend Poland against Soviet military
intervention.

"We are not Czechs," he concluded.

The above statement,
meanings:
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"We are not Czechs," has two possible

(1) the Czechoslovak army has never been permitted to

mobilize to defend Czechoslovakia against an aggressor, either

against the Germans in 1939 or against the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact
invasion in 1968, or (2) the Poles consider the Czechs to be a
cowardly nation because the Czechs have consistently resorted to
passive rather than active resistance when confronted with a
superior military force.

Therefore, the Poles believe that they

could never count on the Czechs to join an initial insurrection.
Unlike the Czech army, which has not supported the people
of Czechoslovakia against aggressors, the Polish army would support
a national insurrection.

According to 1969 statistics, the Polish

army was composed of about 275*000 men in time of peace.

3

A

reserve organization and citizen's militia also exists.
In his book Poland 19^^-1962:

The Sovietization of a

Captive People, Richard Staar states that Poles in general make
excellent troops and their morale is rated outstanding when they
are convinced that they are fighting for their homeland.

The

emotional factor of patriotism plays a considerable part in their
attitude toward war.

This was especially evident during the

Second World War when many Poles fought on several fronts to
liberate not only their homeland, but also many parts of Europe
from Nazi rule.

k

The current political situation in Czechoslovakia is also
critical.

'In. April, 1 9 6 9 , First Secretary of the Czechoslovak

Communist Party and President of the Republic (since May, 1975)
Gustav Husak came to power in Czechoslovakia after the Soviet
Union forced the Czechoslovak Communist Party elite to remove
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Alexander Dubcek from the position of First Secretary.

Dub8ek had

attempted to eliminate the harshness of the neo-Stalinist period
in Czechoslovakia under Antonin Novotny by granting freedoms
unprecedented in a Communist-ruled country to the Czechs and the
Slovaks during the first eight months of 1968.

The result of the

so-called "Prague Spring” was the brutal Soviet-led VJarsaw Pact
invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 20, 1968.
Since his usurpation of power in 1969, Gustav Ilusak has
imposed his own version of Stalinism in Czechoslovakia.

The

people of Czechoslovakia are very dissatisfied politically despite
the fact that the HusAk regime has bribed them with the second
highest standard of living in the entire socialist bloc, behind
that of the German Democratic Republic.
On January 1, 1977, 282 Czech intellectuals, many of whom
were associated with Alexander Dubcek and the 1968 "Prague Spring",
signed a manifesto,

the Charter 77, which is an appeal to the

Husak regime to honor its commitments to respect fundamental human
rights in Czechoslovakia, guaranteed in the United Nations
Declaration on Human Rights and in the 1975 Helsinki Declaration.
The full text of Charter 77 is in Appendix A.
According to Iiella Pick, a correspondent for the The
Guardian, the Charter 77 signatories denied that they were trying
to establish a political opposition group, but the regime has
strongly condemned the manifesto.

Six of the signatories were

detained by the police, but were later released.^
Charter 77 could mark the beginning of a national protest

7

movement, the first in Czechoslovakia since the 1968 invasion, which
could lead to difficult times for the unpopular Husak regime.

There

fore, is it reasonable to assume that the current volatile economic
situation in Poland could provoke a widespread insurrection within
the Polish population which could then trigger a revolt of mutual
support among the politically discontented Czechs?
Statement of Thesis, Justification, Scope, and Focus
The purpose of this thesis is to show that the prospects
for Czech support of a potential Polish insurrection appear to be
negligible.

Why?

The answer to this intriguing question lies in underlying
historical Czech-Polish animosities, border disputes, misunder
standings, and mutual cultural prejudices.

One of these prejudices

has already been stated— the Poles regard the Czechs as a cowardly
nation.

In turn, the Czechs consider the Poles to be reckless

romantics.
These antagonisms and mutual cultural prejudices between the
Czechs and the Poles, which have led to widespread mutual indiffer
ence, have contemporary political relevance and are, therefore,
important to the political study of post-war Eastern Europe.

Because

of these historical Czech-Polish hostilities and cultural prejudices,
Soviet hegemony in Czechoslovakia and in Poland has been made easier
to maintain.

Soviet military occupation of Czechoslovakia and

Poland as well as Soviet economic controls have also played
significant roles in the maintenance of Soviet hegemony in the two

satellite states.

However,

the assumption of this thesis is that

historical animosities and mutual cultural prejudices between the
Czechs and the Poles have also played a very crucial role.
Therefore, the focus of the thesis is to demonstrate that
Czech-Polish conflicts, misunderstandings, mutual petty jealousies,
and mutual cultural prejudices, which have resulted from a diverse
historical development in Bohemia and in Poland, have kept the
two neighboring Slavic nations hostile to each other.

Because of

these factors, the probability of Czech support for a potential
Polish revolt appears to be negligible.
However, certain factors play a role in overcoming the
probability of revolt in either Czechoslovakia or in Poland, be it
mutual support or otherwise.

These factors are important but play

a secondary role in the thesis.

The factors are:

(l) the very high

standard of living in Czechoslovakia compared to that of Poland
(The food shortage found in Poland has no counterpart in Czechoslo
vakia, and one can assume that the Czechs would not sympathize with
the critical Polish situation.), and (2) the intense fear in
Czechoslovakia and in Poland of Soviet armed intervention to suppress
any revolts as were the cases in Hungary i n .1956 and Czechoslovakia
in 1 9 6 8 .

(Given the geopolitical realities of post-war Europe, the

Soviet Union would never permit any of her Eastern European satellite
to leave the socialist bloc.)
The scope.of the thesis, covering the years 1918 to 1 9 6 8 , is
broad in opder to demonstrate that Czech-Polish antagonisms have an
extensive existence.

These antagonisms began considerably prior to
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1 9 1 8 , but the thesis begins with the foundation of the two states,
Czechoslovakia and Poland, after the end of the First World War and
closes with the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.
The scope of the thesis reveals that the Czechs and the
Poles suffered from two major points of disagreement between 1918
and 1 9 6 8 :

(1) Czech friendship toward Russia as opposed to Polish

antagonism toward Russia, and (2) the dispute over Teschen, a rich
coal area on the Czech-Polish border in southern Silesia.

The

Teschen issue was finally resolved in 19^7*
The Czech friendship toward Russia has a long history, as
does the corresponding Polish antagonism toward Russia.

As a

result of this very crucial factor, conflicts and misunderstandings
between the Czechs and the Poles ensued from 1918 to 1 9 6 8 .

However,

in 1968, the Soviet Union brutally crushed the "Prague Spring" in
Czechoslovakia and simultaneously destroyed the Czech amity for
Russia.
Therefore, a major point of contention between the Czechs
and the Poles could have been overcome.

However, because Polish

soldiers also participated in the 1 9 6 8 . invasion of Czechoslovakia,
a potential Czech-Polish rapprochement perished in the smoke over
Prague.

Unfortunately, Polish participation in the 1968 invasion

of Czechoslovakia only reinforced Czech hostility toward the entire
Polish nation.

IQ
Theoretical Framework and Analytical Tools
Within the theoretical framework of this thesis, the prin
cipal subject of inquiry is the role of Czech-Polish attitude
formations resulting from Czech-Polish transactions across the
Czechoslovak-Polish border.

In the study of Communist-controlled

states, however, it is extremely difficult to assess attitudes
because of the scarcity of reliable data.

Fortunately, the major

ity of the research sources employed in this thesis was gathered
in Eastern Europe.
This study also employs one political theory and one
political hypothesis to analyze Czech-Polish relations:

(l) the

"spillover" theory, and (2) a Marshall R. Singer hypothesis which
deals with the relationship of two small Communist states vis-avis a larger Communist state, the Soviet Union.
According to Inis L. Claude, the separability of economic
problems from political problems is only temporary.

Claude

employs the functional "spillover" theory which states that
excellent relations between two states in the economic sphere may
"spillover" into the political sphere and lead to political inte
gration.^

Economic relations between Czechoslovakia and Poland

have been excellent since 19^7* but the Czechs and the Poles have
remained politically distant.

Therefore, it appears as if the

"spillover" theory has no validity in the case of Czechoslovakia
and Poland.
Finally, the following Marshall R» Singer hypothesis is
employed to analyze the relationships among the Communist elites in

11
Prague, Warsaw, and Moscow in the years 1956, 1968, and 1971:
In terms of measurable indices of behavior such
as economic, communications, military, or formal poli
tical ties, two weak states (A and B) may be equally
dependent upon a strong third state (X).
But if, for
some reasons, there is a higher degree of similarity
of political perception between the elites of A an X
than there is between the elites of B and X, the
likelihood is that the international political beha
vior of A will more closely approximate and support
the political behavior of X than it will of the
political behavior of B.
This hypothesis has a great deal of validity in the case
of Czechoslovakia and Poland and is important to the premise that
Czech-Polish animosities have made it easier for the Soviet Union
to maintain hegemony in those t\iro satellite states.

12
NOTES:
^The Best Government
1976), pp. 8 , l4, 2 9 .

(New York:

The Free Europe Committee,

2

Jean--Franc;ois Revel, "La resovietasation," L 1Express, No*
1320 (October 25-31, 1976), p. 6 9 .
^Bela K. Kiraly, "Why the Soviets Need the Warsaw Pact,"
East Europe Vol. 18, No. 4
(April, 1 9 6 9 ), p. 8 .
I.L

Richard F. Staar, Poland 1 9 ^ - 1 9 6 2 :
The Sovletization of
a Captive People
(Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press,
1 9 6 2 ), p. 1 3 9 .
5

He11a Pick, "Czech protesters gather support," The Guardian
(January 16, 1977), p. 9.
^Inis L. Claude, Swords into Plowshares
House and Knopf, 1 9 6 *1), p. 351.
7

(New York:

Random

Marshall R. Singer, Weak States in a World of Powers:
The
Dynamics of International R e l a t i o n s h i p s (New Y o r k : T h e Free Press,
1972), p. 318.
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CULTURAL AND POLITICAL BASES OF CZECHOSLOVAK-POLISH RELATIONS,
1918-19^5
This chapter examines the diverse historical development in
Bohemia and in Poland.

This diverse historical development has led

to mutual Czech-Polish antagonisms, cultural prejudices, and petty
jealousies which continue to plague proper relations between the
Czechs and the Poles.

The chapter also emphasizes the importance

of the conflict over Teschen as well as the Czech-Polish disagree
ment about the role of the Soviet Union in Eastern European affairs.
These two events played crucial roles in undermining Czech-Polish
rapprochement during the inter-war and war periods and contributed
to Soviet hegemony in Czechoslovakia and in Poland after the end
of the Second World War.
The Inter-war Years, 1918-19^5
The Creation of Czechoslovakia and Poland at Versailles
In the late autumn of 1918, after the fall of the AustroHungarian Empire, the treaty of Versailles created the Republic of
Czechoslovakia composed of the Czech lands (Bohemia and Moravia),
Slovakia, and Ruthenia.

Thomas Garrigue Masaryk became the

republic's first president and served in that capacity

until his

death in 1937»
Also, in November, 1918, the Polish government issued a
decree which declared that Poland was a republic upon the first
convocation of the Sejm (parliament).

Jozef PiXsudski was

temporarily declared Chief of State.
Simultaneously with the creation of the new Polish Republic,
the young Polish state entered into quarrels over its borders
which had not yet been established despite the fact that Poland
suffered from not only a ruined economy after the war, but also
from overwhelming poverty.

In February, 1919, Pil-sudski decided

to launch an offensive into the territories of the Ukraine, White
Russia, and Lithuania.

Furthermore, the western borders of the

young Polish state were not peaceful.

In December, 1918, Poles

living in the Grand Duchy of Poznan rose up in revolt against the
Germans.
1 91 9. 1

The Duchy officially joined the Polish Republic in June,
Finally, disagreement over the Czech-Polish border led to

armed conflict and fruitless diplomatic discussions between
Czechoslovakia and Poland.
. The Czech-Polish Conflict over Teschen, 1918-1938
On November 5, 1918, the Polish Rada Narodowa Ksi^stwa
Cieszynskiego (National Council for the Duchy of Teschen) and the
Czech Zemsky Narodni Vybor pro Slezsko (National Land Council for
Silesia) signed an interim agreement which created a line of
demarcation in Teschen (Czech— ^esky Tesin; Polish— Cieszyn) to
limit conflicts.

Under the agreement, the Polish Rada Narodowa

controlled the ethnically Polish region around Teschen (8 0 percent
Polish population versus 20 percent Czech) plus the rich coal mines
at Karwinskie Zag^fbie.

However, the Czechoslovak government did

not accept this agreement because heavily industrialized Czecho
slovakia required the rich Polish coal mines for her industrial

15

production.
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Therefore, by the end of 1918, the Czechs were

prepared for the military takeover of the entire Silesian area
around Teschen.
Taking advantage of the Polish conflict in the Ukraine and
White Russia, as well as declaring that the Poles had rejected the
Teschen agreement of November 5» 1918, because Teschen was to be
included in the approaching Polish parliamentary elections, the
Czech army crossed the line of demarcation on January 23, 1919*
Approximately sixteen thousand well-armed Czech soldiers encountered
little resistance in overwhelming fifteen hundred Polish soldiers,
some coal miners, iron workers, railway employees, and peasants.
On January 30 > 1919» Polish reinforcements halted the Czech
offensive at Skoczow.

On February 3* 1919» Czechoslovak Foreign

Minister Edvard Benes and Polish Minister Roman Dmowski signed a
new agreement in Paris which dealt with the disputed area.

The

old line of demarcation was not restored because the Czechs occupied
the coal mines at Karwinskie ZagX<?bie

which proved to be of great

importance for Czech industry.
On August 10, 1920, at Sevres, France, the Council of
Ambassadors of the Great Powers divided the disputed Silesian area
around Teschen between Czechoslovakia and Poland.
an area of 1,012 sq. km. plus 1^1,000 persons.

Poland received

This area included

the district of Bielsko, sections of the Duchy of Teschen, the
district of Frysztat, the city of Teschen, except for the railway
station and tracks, plus sections of Spis and Orava, both located
in northern Slovakia.

Czechoslovakia received the remainder—

16
1 ,2 7 0 sq. km, and 2 9 3 *0 0 0 persons plus the rich coal mines at
Karwinskie ZagXqbie, the primary goal of the 1919 Czech military
3
intervention.

See the map on the following page.

The Western powers hoped
Teschen

issue between the

that this division would solve the

Czechs and the Poles.

Unfortunately, the

issue continued to be a source of constant border conflicts which
culminated in the Polish armed intervention of Czechoslovakia in
1938.
Despite the border conflicts between Czechoslovakia and
Poland during the first years of the new states'■ existence, political
relations between the two states to 1926 were cool, but proper.
In May, 1926, theJozef PiXsudski coup d ’etat in Poland
brought

into question the

relations.

modest improvement in Czech-Polish

PiXsudski possessed strong anti-Czech sentiments.

He

refused to forgive the Czechs for their 1919 Teschen intervention
as

well as for their 1920 refusal to permit the transit of French

arms to Poland during the Polish war with Soviet Russia.
The nomination of Colonel Jdzef .Beck in December,
be

the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs was unfortunate

and for Czechoslovakia.

1932, to
for Poland

Because of his intense personal aversion

for Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Edvard BeneIf and for the Czechs,
Beck conducted a foreign policy designed to lead to rapprochement
with Nazi Germany against Czechoslovakia.

Therefore, the Polish

minority issue in the Silesian area around Teschen resurfaced as
an important point of contention.

Beck intended to employ the

Polish minority issue in Czechoslovakia to realize his long-range
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objective, the destruction of Czechoslovakia.
Under pressure from the Polish government and the Polish
consulate in Czechoslovakia (the Czechs and the Poles did not have
full diplomatic relations during the inter-war period),

the leaders

of the Polish political groups active in Czech Silesia began to
oppose the Czech government.

In commemoration of the fifteenth

anniversary of the Teschen conflict, the Polish groups organized
demonstrations, ignited nationalistic sentiments among the Poles,
and encouraged the breakdown of peaceful Czech-Polish coexistence.
After the 1935 Czechoslovak parliamentary elections, relations
between the two nationalities became tenser, and constant demon
strations and manifestations of hatred on both sides were a
normal phenomenon.^
In the Polish government and in the private press, antiCzech articles began to appear more frequently.

PiXsudski, driven

by his old pretenses and hatreds for Czechoslovakia, refused to
hold audiences with the Czech envoy in Warsaw, Girsa.

PiXsudski

considered Czechoslovakia to be an artificial creation which could
not possibly continue to exist because of her three million Germans
plus active Slovak, Hungarian, and Polish separatist movements.
Because of his negative attitude, PiXsudski preferred not to conclude
any agreements with Czechoslovakia.
In 193^, the PiXsudski-Beck regime was prepared to reannex
the entire Silesian area around Teschen to the Olza B i v e r , e. g . ,
Zaolzie.

The Polish General Staff was summoned under a conspira

torial organization entitled the "Committee of Seven," whose
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purpose was to organize the political and sabotage activities in
Teschen.

The principal task of the "Committee of Seven" was to

prepare an armed revolt in the entire Silesian area around Teschen
which would act as a pretext for the Polish army's intervention
into the region.

5

During one of Beck's conversations with French Minister
Barthou, the subject of Czech-Polish relations emerged.

Beck stated

that the basis for the poor relations was neither general policy
nor motives for prestige, but rather the Czech government's poor
treatment of the Polish minority in Czechoslovakia.

(Jozef Beck

possessed a seemingly pathological hatred for the Czechs which
interfered with clear and objective evaluations of the critical
geographical position of Czechoslovakia and Poland vis-a-vis Nazi
Germany.)

Therefore, when Barthou spoke about the Slavic kinship

of the Czechs and the Poles, Beck reminded him of Poland's
historical sympathy for the "heroic and chivalrous" Hungarians.
(A Hungarian prince, Stefan Batory, was King of Poland from 1575 to
1586.

Furthermore, a lengthy cultural affinity between the Polish

and the Hungarian aristocracies has also existed.)

Beck continued

by stating that despite the common ethnic bond, the Poles feel
little sympathy for the Czechs.

He stated that the Poles hold a

stronger affinity for the Slovaks who, like the Poles, are very
devout Catholics and whose language resembles Polish more than it
does Czech.^

The importance of Beck's statement is explained in

the following section of the chapter.
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Finally, the issue of the Czech treatment of the Polish
minority in Czechoslovakia came to a dramatic climax, the Polish
military annexation of the entire Zaolzie area.
In September, 1938., the Polish government demanded
categorically from Prague that it apply the same rights to the
Polish minority which it had granted to the Sudeten German minority.
Warsaw simultaneously terminated the 1925 agreements with Czecho
slovakia, among them the arbitration treaty.which had the nature
of a pact of non-aggression.

The Polish army began to assemble

on the Czechoslovak-Polish border near Teschen.

For the time being,

the Polish General Staff did not order an attack on Czechoslovakia.
Beck waited until the conclusion of the fatal Munich Conference.
In order to reduce the Polish threat, Kamil Krofta,

the

Czechoslovak Foreign Minister under President BeneiS’ (Benes became
Czechoslovakia's second president after Thomas Masaryk's death in
1937), asked the S oviet envoy in Prague to request Soviet army
maneuvers on the Polish border.

(The Czechs had concluded a pact

of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union in 1935*)

Moscow agreed

to this demand and also informed France that if Poland attacked
Czechoslovakia,

the Soviet army would attack Poland.

However,

Warsaw did not take the Soviet threat seriously because it,over
estimated its own military strength and also counted on German
military assistance.

7

Because he considered Poland to be a major European power,
Beck was infuriated that he had not been invited to Munich to
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participate in the destruction of Czechoslovakia.
reacted with brutality on Czechoslovakia.

Therefore, he

The Polish army's

intervention into the entire Silesian area around Teschen at the
same time of the German annexation of the Sudetenland created the
impression that Germany had agreed with the Polish action.

By

annexing the area, Beck also wished to reveal Poland's alleged
military capabilities.

8

As a result of B e c k ’s intense hatred for the Czechs, he
was blind to the fact that Czechoslovakia was necessary for Poland's
Czechoslovakia's border with Poland measured about 850

security.

kilometres in length and prevented a German attack on Poland from
the south.

9

After Hitler had occupied Czechoslovakia on March 15 ,

1939, Germany surrounded Poland on three sides.

Therefore, Poland

should have stood firm in the defense of Czechoslovakia rather than
participate with Hitler in her destruction.
If Poland had supported Czechoslovakia during the 1938
Sudeten crisis, it is possible that the ’
war of 1939 could have been
avoided.

If war had broken out In 1938, Germany would have suffered

a catastrophic defeat as was foreseen by the German General Staff
because she was not totally prepared for war.

Germany in 1938 did

not yet possess Czechoslovakia's vast economic, industrial, and
military wealth which she did acquire in March, 1939*

It is truly

unfortunate that a man driven by ambition bordering on megalomania
and obsessed with hatred for his southern neighbor held' the reigns
of power in Warsaw during this critical period in European history.
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The importance of the conflict over Teschen was that it
contributed a new phase to a long history of mutual Czech-Polish
distaste.

It corrupted not only the possibility of a Czech-Polish

rapprochement during the inter-war period, but also stood as a
major factor in the failure of the Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation
in 19^3, to be discussed later in this chapter.
was not officially resolved’ until 19^7.

The Teschen issue

Unfortunately, many Czechs

still regard the 1938 Polish intervention into the area as an
issue of contention with the Poles.
The

Cultural Differences between the Czechs and the Poles
A diverse historical development in Bohemia and Poland has

led to numerous contradictory elements in the national character
traits of the Czechs and the Poles.

According to Karl Bader, a

Polish envoy to Prague during the inter-war period, the ill will
between the Czechs and the Poles is explained by a difference in
culture, history, and foreign influences.

These cultural and

historical differences, which have created a diversity of tempera
ment and contributed to a deepening conflict between the Czechs
and

the Poles, are very difficult to overcome.

The Poles, whom the

Czechs consider to be proud and reckless romantics,

regard the

Czechs as slightly-polished peasants despite the fact that their
languages are quite similar.

This ethnic relationship, Bader

continues, has also allowed corresponding weaknesses to develop, e. g . ,
a strong obstinacy in negotiations as well as excessive national
• -4.. .4. 10
sensxtivity.
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"Bourgeois" Czechoslovakia versus "Aristocratic" Poland
William Rose, in his 1951 study of Czech and Polish national
characteristics, writes that the Czech perception of the Poles as
proud, as well as the Polish perception of the Czechs as slightlypolished peasants, is derived from the fact that the Czechs lost
their aristocracy as a result of the Austrian victory over the
Czechs at the Battle of White Mountain in 1620.
cracy was simply annihilated.

The Czech aristo

Thereafter, the Czechs became

virtually a one-class bourgeois society.
On the contrary, the Polish aristocracy, excessively.
influenced by the French aristocracy, dominated Polish affairs up
to the Communist takeover of Poland in 194A.

11

Therefore, the Czechs

and the Poles suffered from the lack of a culturally unifying force
because Czech society was predominantly bourgeois, while Polish
society was divided between a dominating aristocracy and an over
whelming peasant population.
"Bourgeois" Czechoslovakia and "aristocratic" Poland were
eliminated after the Communist takeovers of both states in 19^8 and
19^4, respectively.

However, those character traits can still be

found among many Czechs and Poles today despite "the imposition of
Communism.
Religious Differences between the Czechs and the Poles
Religious differences also represent a factor in explaining
the antagonism between the Czechs and the Poles,
The Roman Catholic Church has always played a very important
role in Polish and in Slovak society.

Despite the imposition of

2k

Communism in Czechoslovakia and in Poland, Poles and Slovaks remain
intensely religious and willingly participate in large numbers at
Mass and Catholic religious festivities.

Anti-clericalism in Poland

and in Slovakia appears to be virtually negligible.

Furthermore,

the Poles and the Slovaks maintain a strong mutual cultural and
ethnic amity.

(Colonel Beck referred to this Polish-Slovak,

cultural amity in his discussion with French minister Barthou.)
On the contrary, the Roman Catholic Church has played a less
important role in Bohemia, where the Hussite Revolt of the fifteenth
century remains a high point in Czech national history.

The

majority of Czechs practice Catholicism, but, because of the strong
Hussite influence on Czech thought, the Czechs tend to be very
anti-clerical and are not as devoutly religious as are the Poles and
the Slovaks.

12

A strong Protestant element, which does not exist in

either Poland or in Slovakia, can also be found in Bohemia.
Czech Passivity versus Polish Romanticism
The Polish perception of the Czechs as a cowardly nation and
the Czech perception of the Poles as reckless romantics are very
crucial elements in the study of Czech-Polish ill will.
The Poles regard the Czechs as cowards because the Czechs
have consistently resorted to realistic passive resistance when
confronting a superior force.

On the other hand,

shown a willingness to die for a cause . ^

the Poles have

In this regard, the Czechs

perceive their northern Slavic neighbors to be reckless romantics.
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Edward Taborsky, Bene§' secretary who fled to the United
States after the 19^-8 Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia, writes
the following about the Czech national character:.

" . . .

down-to-

earth realism, an overdose of caution, a dislike for risks, a lack
of romantic heroism.

When confronted with a superior force, the

average Czech resorts to devious maneuvering, covered by a pretense
of submission rather than overt opposition.

He is ready to fight

only xf the chance for success appears to be imminent."

14

This Czech national preference for "caution, lack of
romantic heroism, and devious maneuvering, covered by a pretense
of submission . . . "

was immortalized in The Good Soldier Schweik,

Jaroslav Halfek-s classic novel about Czech passive resistance
within the Austrian army during the First World War.

The Czech

national characteristic of passive resistance is now called
"Schweikism".
During the Second World War, the diverse national character,
traits of the Czechs and the Poles revealed themselves in striking
statistics.

Six million Poles, or 2.2. percent of the Polish popula

tion, perished, while only 1.5 percent of the Czech population was
killed.

Within the realm of national v/ealth, Poland lost 58 percent,

while Czech losses were negligible.

15

The Polish capital of Warsaw

was completely destroyed during the war, while Prague, the Czecho
slovak capital, remained virtually unscathed despite the war.
The above statistics have led the Poles to believe that the_
Czechs collaborated with the Nazis in Czechoslovakia during the war
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to save their lives and their lovely capital.

The Polish

perception of the Czechs to be "Germanized" Slavs is extremely
important for comprehending the general Polish reaction to the
Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in which Poland
played an important role.

The invasion is discussed in the fourth

chapter.
Diverse Czech and Polish Perceptions vis-a-vis Russia
The diverse historical development in Bohemia and in
Poland also led to the sharpest and most crucial difference between
the

Czechs and the Poles, the disagreement over the role of the

Soviet Union in Eastern European affairs.

The Czechs possessed a

positive attitude toward the Soviet Union, while the Poles held a
correspondingly negative one.

The diversity of attitude between

the

Czechs and the Poles concerning the Soviet Union was vital for

the

Soviet Union's post-war intentions in Czechoslovakia and in

Poland.
After the Habsburg victory over the Czechs at White Mountain
in 1620, the Czech lands fell under Austrian control for almost
three hundred years.

Because of Austria's intensive Germanization/

program, Czech culture and language were almost liquidated.

The

trend toward Germanization was finally checked, if not definitely
halted, during the final quarter of the eighteenth century, when a
small group of patriotic Czech scholars, writers, and teachers began
to work for the cause of Czech liberty and national awareness.

At

the same time, many Czechs looked to Russia as the most important
Slavic nation and the potential liberator of the Czechs from Austrian
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hegemony
This favorable Czech attitude toward Russia explains the
Czech refusal to permit the transit of French arms to Poland during
Poland's 1920 war with the Soviet Union, the 1935 CzechoslovakSoviet Pact of Mutual Assistance, and the failure of the Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation in 19^3»

Unfortunately,

this positive

Czech attitude toward Russia endured until 1968, when it was
finally crushed under the weight of Soviet tanks.
On the contrary, the Poles could not share or comprehend
the Czech viewpoint that Russia would liberate the Slavs from the
Germans.

After the Partitions of Poland in 1772, 179 3 1 and 1795»

the Poles rose up in revolt against the Russians in 179*N 1830-31,
and again in 1 8 6 3 .

Each time the Russian armies brutally

suppressed the revolts.

Therefore, the Poles developed a firmly

negative attitude toward anything Russian.

Furthermore, because

the Czechs were pro-Russian, the Poles considered them to be proCommunist during the inter-war period.

(The Czechs believed that

because the Poles were anti-Russian, they were consequently not
true Slavs.
The importance of the diverse Czech-Polish attitude toward
the Soviet Union becomes clearer in the third part of this chapter
as well as in the subsequent chapters of the thesis.
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The War Years
The Failure of the Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation
In November, 19^0, Dr. Edvard Benes, the head of the
Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile in London, formally initiated
negotiations with the Polish Government-in-Exile, led by General
W^adys^aw Sikorski, to form a post-war Czechoslovak-Polish confedera
tion.

Sikorski, whose pro-Czechoslovak sympathies were an unusual

quality for a Pole, overwhelmingly supported the idea.

On November

11, 19^0, the two governments signed a joint declaration favoring
closer political and economic cooperation*

The plan offered

Czechoslovakia and Poland the possibility of becoming a joint
confederated power in Central Europe after the end of the war.
Bene& attempted to create the confederation with Poland to
defend Czechoslovakia's exposed geographical position in Central
Europe in the post-war era.
Germany.

Bene& was afraid of a revitalized

Having been betrayed by France and Great Britain in 1938

and 1939* Bene& felt that his best option was to form an alliance
with his eastern neighbor.

18

However, in 19^3* less than three years after its initia
tion, the Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation failed miserably.

The

confederation failed for two reasons, both of which are discussed in
this chapter:

(1)

the Czech-Polish conflict over Teschen, and (2)

the disagreement over the role of the Soviet Union in Eastern
European affairs.

The failure of the Czechoslovak-Polish Confedera

tion ensured the Soviet Union's post-war domination of Czechoslovakia
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and Poland.
In his book Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation and the Great
-Powers, Piotr Wandycz writes that the declaration to form the
confederation did not solve the existing differences between Benes
and Sikorski.

The declaration's primary importance was to commit

the two governments to close cooperation.

However, the two states

men possessed diverse opinions concerning the role of the Soviet
Union in Eastern European affairs.

Bene^ believed that the Czechs

and the Poles should cooperate with the Soviet Union, while
Sikorski feared the Russians.

Sikorski pushed for greater political,

economic, and military cooperation between Czechoslovakia and
Poland and pleaded with Bene& to exclude the Russians from any
Czech-Polish negotiations.

19

Given the favorable Czech attitude

toward the Russians as well as the corresponding Polish antagonism,
Bene&' and Sikorski's actions are not difficult to comprehend.
Wandycz feels that Benes proposed the creation of a Czecho
slovak-Polish confederation not out of a desire to ameliorate CzechPolish relations, but rather out of selfish opportunism.

Because

Czechoslovakia was in a vacuum without her chief ally, the Soviet
Union, which had not yet entered the war, Bene£ turned to the Poles
with his proposal to form a confederation.

However, Benes' proposal

to form a confederation with Poland was purposely made vague so as
not to jeopardize Czechoslovak relations with the Soviet Union.
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The following statement by Beneif on July 12, 19^1, verifies
Wandycz's observation that Banes' was waiting for the Soviet Union to
enter the war.

The statement also reveals Bene&' insight into the
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future of post-war Europe:
The whole future depends on the victory or the
defeat of Russia, oh the condition in which she leaves
the war.
For us (Czechoslovakia), that is the deciding
factor.
After the war as well as for the next twenty
years, France will not yet possess the strength to
play a leading role in European politics.
For the next
five years, England will be weak and go with America on
another path.
Only Russia and Germany will remain in
Europe, so, I hope that Russia will play the deciding
role.
For us, this foundation is exceptionally
important; the whole future of the republic depends on
it.
I am only c o n c e d e d that the Russians perform
their politics well.
After the Soviet Union entered the war, Stalin easily
manipulated Benes to force him to halt his negotiations with Sikorski.
With Stalin's support, Benes renewed his demands for the return of
Teschen

to Czechoslovakia.

(The subject of Teschen had been dis

creetly

and intentionally placed aside during the initial Czech-

Polish negotiations to form the confederation.)

Sikorski himself

believed that Poland's possession of Teschen was justifiable.
In regard to Stalin, Sikorski pleaded with Benes not to
believe in Stalin for he was convinced that Stalin possessed post
war territorial ambitions in Czechoslovakia and in Poland.

However,

Benes continued to believe in Stalin until just prior to his death
in June, 19^8, after the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia in
February of that same year.

Bene£ finally realized that he had been

Stalin's dupe, as he confirmed, on his death bed:

"My greatest mis

take was that I refused to believe to the very last that even
Stalin lied to me cynically both in 1935 [the year that Czechoslovakia
and the Soviet Union signed the Pact of Mutual A s s i s t a n c 0

and later,
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and that his assurances to me and to Masaryk

(Jan,

the first

president's amiable son who served as Czechoslovak Foreign Minister
until his death by defenestration in 19^C! were an intentional
deceit."

22

Thus,

the argument over Teschen as well as the disagree

ment over the role of the Soviet Union in Eastern European affairs
destroyed the Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation in 19^3*

After the

confederation had failed, Benes went to Moscow in December, 19^3»
and concluded a treaty of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union
in which each state pledged to act after the war "in accordance
with the principles of mutual' respect for the independence and
sovereignty, as well as of non-interference in the internal affairs,
of the other state."
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It was also agreed that as Russian troops

entered Czechoslovakia, they would be accompanied by Czech forces,
and the liberated areas would be progressively handed over to the
Czechoslovak civil administration.

However, none of Stalin's

promises was honored.
The confederation represented the first and only endeavor
by the two hostile Slavic nations to attempt to settle their long
history of antagonism and mistrust. • The London negotiations
represented an ideal situation for the resolution of disputes
between the two states of Czechoslovakia and Poland because London
was a neutral site.

Once the Soviet Union began to interfere, the

ideal situation perished, and the mutual Czech-Polish inability to
comprehend each other's historical perceptions renewed the old
antagonisms.
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The long history of Czech amity toward Russia and the
corresponding Polish distrust for Russia proved to be the decisive
factors.

Therefore, Dr. Bene£ undermined his own enlightened 19^0

proposal to create the Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation because
his positive Czech attitude toward Russia superseded any super
ficial intention of ameliorating Czech relations with the Poles.
The Poles themselves could never comprehend the Czech amity toward
Russia.
The failure of the confederation ensured Soviet hegemony in
Czechoslovakia and in Poland after the end of the Second World War.
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Od Mnichova k nove valce a k novemu

C H A P T E R

III

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF CZECHOSLOVAK-POLISH
RELATIONS,

1945-196?

The purpose of this chapter is twofold.

The first purpose

is to discuss the Polish government's 1956 liberalization program
which resulted from widespread popular demands for "democratic"
changes within Stalinist Poland.

Reactions of the Czech people and

government to the liberalization program in Poland are also examined.
The second purpose of this chapter is to examine the
excellent economic relations between Czechoslovakia and Poland
despite the correspondingly poor political relations which continue
to exist between the two states.

The section 011 economic relations

attempts to show that even though Czechoslovakia and Poland enjoy
excellent economic relations, the political relations between the
two states remain distant despite the imposition of Communism in both
states after the end of the Second World War.
The Impact of the Stalinist Period in Poland
In 1944, the Red Army entered Poland from the east and
established a pro-Soviet Polish Communist government in Lublin.
By the time of the Potsdam Conference in July, 1945, the
United States and Great Britain had recognized the new Communistdominated Polish government in Lublin, though stressing its
obligation to "hold free and unfettered elections as soon as
possible" in accordance with the agreement at Yalta.

Both
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Churchill and Truman pressed Stalin for public assurances that the
Polish elections should also be freely observed by the world press.
Stalin, after some argument, agreed to include in the Potsdam
communique' some words about the observation of free elections in
Poland.

Although the Soviet premier had told Roosevelt at Yalta

that elections could take place in Poland one month after the
country's liberation from the Nazis, it was actually two years
later, in January, 19^7, that elections were held— after the nonCommunist parties in Poland, especially the popular Stanis^aw
MikoXajczyk's Peasant Party, had been thoroughly terrorized, their
news censored, their meetings often banned, and some of their
leaders jailed.
Poland's boundaries had been redrawn at the 19^5 Potsdam
Conference.

During the war, Stalin had occupied the Polish lands

east of the so-called Curzon line.

In order to compensate Poland

for her territorial losses in the east, Poland expanded west to the
Oder-Neisse line at the. expense of Germany.

The Oder-Neisse issue

became the unpopular Communist government's most important means of
support from the Polish population.
The border issue is of vital importance to the Poles who do
support the government on the issue no matter what their political
affiliation.

Because the horror of the Second World War remains

among the Poles, the fear of the German Federal Republic and of
German reunification is oftentimes stronger among the Polish people
than the Western press indicates.

The perceived military strength

of the Federal Republic is also stronger than is the Republic's
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actual military strength.
The Polish Communists constantly remind
of the Oder-Neisse border issue.

the Polish

nation

Poland is notnecessarily

following Moscow's dictates in opposing reunification of the two
Germanies or transferal of the borders, but rather the Poles are
acting out of personal conviction no matter what their political
point of view.^
After the 19^7 elections, the Communists were firmly in
power in Poland.

Terrorism in the name of Stalin became common

place throughout the country.

The state

to collectivize their lands according to

forced

the Polish peasants

the Soviet model, although

resistance to the policy of collectivization remained strong
throughout the Stalinist period.

Polish industry was nationalized,

the Roman Catholic Church was persecuted, intensive Russification
became the norm, and those who opposed the regime were imprisoned,
maltreated, or both.

The Communists also suppressed all of the

former Polish soldiers who had fought against the Nazis in Poland
or in the West with the Allies because they considered them to be
"enemies of the state,"

The Silesian industrial city of Katowice

was also renamed "Stalinogrcfd" in honor of Stalin.
The importance of Russification is glaring in the case of
Poland.

The previous chapter has already discussed the long

historical Polish animosity toward Russia a-s well as toward anything
Russian.

However, because the Poles are Slavs, they were required

to identify with the concepts of pan-Slavism, the "great"' Russian
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people, their history, and their contemporary world-wide contri
butions.

Russian language became, and still is, a mandatory

subject in Polish schools.
In 19^9, in order to rewrite the dismal record of PolishRussian history, t h e .pro-Soviet Bierut regime inaugurated
"Friendship with the U.. S. S. R. Month" in Poland.
drive, no phase of propaganda was overlooked.

During this

The drive included

mass meetings throughout the country, performances of Russian plays
and films, exhibitions, lectures, concerts, and the sale of 5 0 0 ,0 0 0
Russian books.

During "friendship month", all theatres in Poland

showed Russian modern and classical plays, and most cinemas
were restricted to Russian films.

The world-publicized Chopin

Centennial also had to compete for a place with Russian music on
Polish radio.^
Historically, Poland has usually been considered along with
Ireland as the stronghold and bastion of Roman Catholicism.

Ninety-

five percent of the Poles practice Catholicism, and the faith is
associated^ with Polish patriotism and nationalism.

Therefore,

because of Marxist atheism and also because the Church represented
competition to Marxist ideology, the complete eradication of
Catholicism in Poland became the objective of the Bierut regime.
However, the Communists have still not succeeded in their goal to
eradicate Catholicism from Polish society.
With the arrest of Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski in September,
1953* Communist persecution of the Roman Catholic Church reached
its climax.

The period that followed was marked by a cessation of

ko

attacks against Church dignitaries and a decrease in regime assaults
on religious festivities.
However, within the bounds of a more cautious policy, the
Bierut regime continued indirect steps to tighten its control
over the Church.

On August 2, 195^ 1 the regime announced the

liquidation of the theological faculties at the Universities of
Cracow and of Warsaw.

In December, 195^+» the regime announced the

abolition of religious instruction in the Polish school system.
The decree applied'to all public schools.

Religious instruction

was restricted to special and private religious schools as well, as
to the Catholic University in Lublin.

However, religious instruc

tion at the Catholic University was also curtailed.
The Bierut regime partially acknowledged its failure to
diminish the Church's influence in Poland by permitting the revival
of religious processions on holidays, by dealing cautiously with
large numbers of church-goers, including members of the Communist
Party, and by adopting a more tolerant attitude toward religious
practices.

In 1955 ■» there were an estimated 2,000 convents and

monasteries in Poland plus a total of 8,37^ churches, not including
1,690 small chapels and 1 ,6 6 2 churches acquired in the formerly
German territories.
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In conclusion, one astute Polish political observer, writing
in 1 9 6 8 , describes the evils of one-party rule in the Eastern
European states:
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Among all of the common characteristics found
among the states in the socialist camp, the most
important is the principle of one-party rule.
An
attempt is made to legitimize one-party rule in a
society which has liquidated classes and nationalized
the private means of production.
A society dominated
by one-party rule is a society deprived of internal
contradictions, a society without differences.
There
fore, only one party is necessary.
That premise is false because even within a
classless society, people are different.
Means exist
to isolate and to differentiate groups with diverse
interests and demands.
Even a society deprived of
class differences is not a uniform society, but
rather one composed of groups with changing and even
conflicting needs and desires.
The goal of a state
as an institution is to integrate the various groups
as well as to create a means of mediation among them.
A multi-party system attempts to create a
legal framework for groups of diverse interests.
A"
system of one-party rule, both in theory and in
practice, negates the existence of conflicting groups
and also negates thg appearance of social tension
within the society.
The Impact of the Stalinist Period in Czechoslovakia
On May 6, 19if5» General George S. Patton's Third Army
liberated the Czech city of Plzen, located sixty miles southwest of
Prague, but halted there., A Soviet-American agreement made in
early April had defined Plzen as the "line of demarcation" in
Czechoslovakia.

The Russian high command had already mapped

"Operation Prague" and asked the Americans to allow them to liberate
the Czechoslovak capital.

The Plzen agreement was neither the first

nor the last time that the major powers "played spheres of influence"
in Czechoslovakia.
The Prague Uprising against the Nazis began on May

19^5*

On May 8, Prague was liberated by General Vla s o v ’s Ukrainian Regiment

h-2

which had been fighting with the Nazis against the Soviets.

(General

Vlasov's Ukrainian regiment was fighting for Ukrainian independence
from the Soviet Union.)

On May 9» 19^5, the Red Army entered Prague,

and that date is now observed in Czechoslovakia as "Soviet Liberation
n

Day".

The Soviets thereafter executed General Vlasov.
Unlike Poland which fell under Communist control during the

war, Czechoslovakia remained a democracy until the Communist
coup d'etat in February, 19^8.
Communist

However, the preparations for the

coup began immediately after the end of the war.

After the war, the Communists, led by Element Gottwald,
exploited the situation in Czechoslovakia created by the Soviet military
presence and liberation by acquiring control of key cabinet posts in
the government, police, radio, and land distribution.

By control

ling these important positions, the Communists forced through
nationalization of industry and currency reform, both designed to
weaken the influence of the bourgeoisie.

They also exploited their

wartime prestige acquired during the Slovak Uprising of
In May,. 19^6, the first post-war parliamentary elections took
place.

The Red Army was not present within the Czechoslovak borders

to exert pressure, but it was located in all of the countries
surrounding Czechoslovakia.
The Communists won 38 percent of the total national vote, more
in the Czech lands than in Slovakia.

The Social Democrats won 12.8

percent, the Czech National Socialists (President Bene^' political
party).18.2 percent, the Catholic People's Party 15.8 percent, and
the Slovak Democrats 13*8 percent.

The 19^6 parliamentary elections

were the last free elections to take place in Czechoslovakia.
Dana Adams Schmidt describes the situation in Prague one
month prior to the Communist coup d ’etat of February 25, 19^8, which
resulted from a parliamentary crisis:
The city of Prague in that month of January,
19^8, before the cou p , presented a deceptively
pleasant cosmopolitan picture.
The big downtown
newsstands were stuffed with newspapers from England,
France, and Switzerland, as well as from the east
European countries that had gone Communist, and from
the Soviet Union.
The windows of the bookshops were
piled high, especially with English and American
literature, but also with a fair sprinkling of Marx,
Lenin, and Stalin.
There were plenty of American
plays, although Soviet productions were not entirely
neglected.
Playful Americans and other Western
foreigners on vacation seemed to be everywhere, in
the hotels, restaurants and night clubs.
There were
no Communist counterparts, for Communist countries
do not very often allow their citizens to play in
foreign places.
On the whole, after a casual glance
at Prague, one might have said that "coexistence"
was working well in Czechoslovakia.
Behind the scenes, however, the Communists
were watching for their chance to change radically
the picture presented by Prague,
The chance fell
into their laps, like a gift from the Communist
heaven, in the form of a government crisis over
Communist subversion of the police force.
After the 19^-8 Communist coup d'etat, the Communists repeated
the horrors found in Poland.

Czech and Slovak peasants lost their

lands to intensive collectivization based on the Soviet model;
police terrorism became rampant; Communist purge trials, especially
that of Slansk./ and Clementis in 1951 * occurred throughout the land;
Russification developed in Czechoslovak schools, universities, and
cultural life; the Roman Catholic Church suffered from .cruel
persecution, and Archbishop Beran was imprisoned; forced labor camps
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were built throughout the country; and the role played by the
Western armies in the liberation of Czechoslovakia was ignored.
Klement Gottwald, First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Commu
nist Party and President of the Republic from 19^8 until his death
in 1953, ruled Czechoslovakia with an iron hand.

(Gottwald caught

cold at Stalin's 1953 funeral and died three weeks later of
pneumonia aggravated by an earlier case of s y p h i l i s . ^

His Stalin

ist counterpart in Poland, Boles^faw Bierut, also suffered a violent
death— he was murdered in 1956 in Moscow while attending the
Twentieth Soviet Party Congress.)

Antonin Zapotocky" replaced

Gottwald as president in 1953* while Antonin Novotny became First
Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party.
the presidency after Zapotocky's death in 1957*

Novotny also acquired
Novotny continued

Gottwald's Stalinist policies until his ouster in January, 1968.
Czechoslovak-Polish Agreements and Treaties, 19^6-1955
During the Stalinist period, Czechoslovakia and Poland made
concerted efforts to establish political and economic integration.
Close political relations between Czechoslovakia and Poland continued
until 1956, when Poland commenced her "independent road" to socialism.
Since 1956, Czechoslovak-Polish relations have remained correct,
although they have been strained.
The two states signed the following agreements and treaties
during the period 19^+6-1955:
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1.

January 24, 1946
Prague

Agreement concerning air
communications

2.

February 12, 1946
Prague

Agreement on the mutual return
of property removed after the
outbreak of the war

3.

March 3, 1947
Warsaw

Treaty of Friendship, Collabora
tion, and Mutual Assistance

4.

July 4, 1947

Agreement on economic coopera
tion; cultural agreement
(two agreements)

Prague

5.

March 23 and 27, 1948
Warsaw

Agreement on the valorization of
custom rates

6.

April 5» 19^8
Warsaw

Agreement on cooperation in
social policy and social
administration

7.

January 21, 1949
Warsaw

Treaty on mutual legal relations
in civil and criminal matters

8.

April 26, 1951
Warsaw

Trade and payments agreement for
the period 1951-1955

9.

March 17, 1953
Prague

Trade and payments agreement for
1953

May 14, 1955
Warsaw

Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation,
and Mutual Assistance (Warsaw
Pact)— Albania (expelled in 1 9 6 2 ),
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hun
gary, the German Democratic
Republic, Poland, and the Soviet
Union

10.

The Czech Reaction to the "Polish October” of 1956
In February, 1956, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev denounced
Stalin as incompetent and a criminal at the Twentieth Soviet Party
Congress in Moscow.

The subsequent de-Stalinization efforts in the

Soviet Union led to dramatic and violent popular demands for similar
de-Stalinization measures in Poland and in Hungary.
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The Poznan Riots, June, 1956
During the first six months of 1956, Poland was without an
economic plan; a six-year plan had come to an end on December 31,
1955, and the new five-year plan was not yet ready by mid-summer.
The Polish economy was collapsing.

From 19^9 to 1955, the index of nominal wages rose from
100 to 2 2 5 .7 , and the official index of prices of consumer goods
and services rose to 1?6.7.

Prices of food and coal, both impor

tant components in a Polish family's budget, rose sharply.
Furthermore, the increases quoted were for prices prevailing on
the official market that supplied only a proportion of the

population's needs.
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Nearly 20,000 workers at ZISPO, the largest factory in
Poznan, were becoming discontented with the economic conditions in
Poland.

Poznan, Poland's fourth largest city, suffered from a

severe housing shortage, but a bread shortage in the city triggered
the explosion.
On Thursday, June 28, 1956, the ZISPO workers decided to
stage a demonstration.

Carrying placards with "Vie want bread" and

"We want lower prices and higher wages," the demonstrators marched
peacefully through the Poznan streets to the Town Hall in Old Town.
Other workers and pedestrians joined the ZISPO workers.

The Poznan

manifestation was the first strike to take place in Poland since
1939.

The demonstration then acquired a revolutionary aspect.
Demonstrators began to shout "Down with the Russians," "We want

V/
freedom," and "Down with the Soviet occupation,"

A frightened

security policeman then shot a woman and child, and spontaneous
rioting broke out, . The rioting spread throughout the city, and
troops and tanks were dispersed to the city to suppress the revolt,
Poznan became a battleground for two days.

The world learned

instantaneously about the Poznan riots because many foreigncorrespondents were in Poznan covering the Poznan’ International
Trade Fair,
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The riots in Poznan caused a great deal of consternation in
the Polish government,

Edward Ochab, who became First Secretary of

the United Polish Workers'

(Communist) Party after Bierut's death,

was totally incapable of governing.

Popular demands for a

"broadening of democracy" in Poland were increasing.

Popular demands

for the release of Cardinal Wyszynski from prison were also voiced.
In August, 1956, one million Catholic Poles gathered at Czestochowa
to honor the Black Madonna at the Jasna Gora monastery.

This anti

government Catholic manifestation was unprecedented in a Communistrun country.
cities.

Eioting also broke out in Warsaw and other Polish

Because of the critical situation, the Polish government

summoned W/adysXaw GomuXka who had been secretly released from
prison in 1955•
The "Polish October"
In 19.^8* Oomu^ka was removed from his position as First
Secretary of the United Polish Workers1 Party and imprisoned for
"rightest-nationalist deviation," e. g . , refusal to endorse the con
struction pf a Communist society in Poland according to the Soviet

model.

GomuXka preferred to build socialism in Poland according to

Polish conditions.

For example, he opposed rapid collectivization

of Polish agriculture.

'GomuXka rejected charges that he opposed

close Polish relations

with the Soviet Union, but he did admit

that

he was against Soviet interference in Poland's domestic affairs.
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Because of his v i e w s , GomuXka enjoyed enormous popularity among
the Poles.

During the

Poland depended solely

1956 crisis, the future ofCommunism in
on Gomu^ka's popularity.

The Polish reform movement under Gomu^ka's guidance, which
became known as the "Polish October", resulted not only from the
economic difficulties which ignited the Poznan riots, but also from
the Polish desire to free Poland from tight Soviet control.

The

removal of Marshall Rokossovsky, the Russian head of the Polish
army and the symbol of Soviet hegemony in Poland, from the Polish
Politboro in October, 1 956i marked a significant change in PolishSoviet relations.

However, Gomu/ka was cautious in his criticism

of the Soviet Union in order to avoid Soviet military intervention
which was threatening Poland in October and November.

On October

20, 1956, GomuXka spoke to the Polish nation over national radio.
Referring

to Polish relations with the Soviet Union, GomuXka stated

These relations ought to be based on mutual
confidence and equality of rights, on mutual assistance,
on mutual friendly criticism . . . arising out of the
spirit of friendship and socialism . . . and the right
of every nation to rule itself in a sovereign manner in
its own independent country ought to be fully and
mutually respected.
The Party and all the people, who saw the evil
that existed in the past and who sincerely desire to
remove all that is left of that evil in our life today
in order to strengthen the foundations of our system,

should give a determined rebuff to all the whisperings
and all the voices which strive to weaken our friend
ship with the Soviet Union.
(Poor Polish-Soviet
relations)— today this belongs to the irrevocable past.

. . . And if there is anyone who thinks that it is
possible to kindle antjpSoviet moods in Poland, then
he is deeply mistaken.
The revolutionary atmosphere in Poland provoked the rebellion
of mutual support among the Hungarians, traditionally linked to the
Poles by firm bonds of friendship.

However, Czechoslovakia remained

quiet.
The Poles envied the Hungarians for their revolutionary
activity because the Hungarians reminded them of their own insur
rections against Russian hegemony in 179^, 1830-31, and 1863.
Warsaw, the following bitter statement was heard:

In

"The Hungarians

are behaving like Poles (willingness to fight for a cause), the
Poles like Czechs (preference for passive resistance), and the Czechs
like swine (self-explanatory)."^

Traditional Polish contempt for

the Czech national preference for passive resistance is obvious in
the preceding statement.
The Czech Reaction
Edward Taborsky
high

and Ivo Duchai’ek believe that Czechoslovakia's

standard of living was the most important factor in preventing

the outbreak of revolution in Czechoslovakia in 1936.

The Czecho

slovak standard of living in the nineteen-fifties and nineteen-

sixties was the highest in the socialist bloc, and Czechoslovakia
was the "showcase" of socialism.

Indifference to
ing states predominated
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theevents in Czechoslovakia's two neighbor
among the Czechs.

Except for the 1953 PlzeS
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riots, which were ignited by currency reforms, the Czech workers
did not show the explosive dissatisfaction with the Communist Party
experienced in Poland and in Hungary.

When Czech workers wished to

manifest their dissatisfaction, they chose traditional non-violent
Czech methods of protest such as passive resistance, occasional
sit-down strikes, widespread absenteeism from work, and recurrent
demands for the Party to fulfill its obligations.
The liberalization in Poland and the violence of the
Hungarian Uprising strengthened the belief of the ZdipotockyNovotny regime that the only hope for the retention of power in
Czechoslovakia was through the increased intimidation of the Czech
and the Slovak peoples as well as through dependence on Soviet
military assistance.
As it became clear how Moscow reacted to the events in
Poland, and especially in Hungary, the official party line in Prague
turned grimly critical of the new "Titoism", and a harsh neoStalinism became the vogue.

Novotny denounced national communism,

the independent road to socialism, as an ally of the imperialists.
He rejected GomuXka's policies and declared that the "Leninist
example remains for us the only binding example which is being
applied creatively in different historic and socio-economic con
ditions."^
In an effort to prevent the dissemination of liberal Polish
ideas into Czechoslovakia, the regime closed the border with Poland
as tightly as it was with the German Federal Republic.
was also jammed.

Polish radio

The Czechoslovak regime remained extremely critical
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of GomuXka's policies, and Novotn/ regarded as heresy GomuXka's
decision to abandon the collectivization of agriculture in Poland.

19

Czechoslovak-Polish Economic Relations, 19^-7-1971
Resolution of the Teschen Dispute
On March 10, 19^+7, Czechoslovakia and Poland signed the
Treaty of Friendship, Collaboration, and Mutual Assistance.

This

treaty called for close Czechoslovak-Polish cooperation, consulta
tion on important international questions, a ban on alliances
directed against a treaty partner, and a strengthening of political,
economic, and cultural ties.

Within the framework of this treaty,

the Czechoslovak-Polish Economic Council was also created.
The Czechoslovak-Polish Economic Council called for joint
Czech-Polish exploitation of the important Teschen industrial region,
the source of bitter Czech-Polish conflict during the inter-war
period as well as one of the factors which destroyed the Czecho
slovak-Polish Confederation during the war.

According to the

agreement, the Poles were to concentrate on coal and steel produc
tion, while the Czechs were to complement this through emphasis on
engineering and industrial production.
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By 1957, Czech-Polish cooperation in the formerly disputed
Teschen region was excellent.

In that year, Czechoslovakia and

Poland signed a bilateral agreement in which the Czechs pledged to
invest sixty-three million dollars worth of machinery into Polish
coal mining in the Teschen region.

The Czechs also agreed to invest

twenty-five million dollars in Polish sulphur exploitation.
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Furthermore,

the two states agreed to the decentralization of

contacts among the various Czech-Polish technical and administrative
agencies.

This was the forerunner of the Inter-governmental

Commissions on Economic, Scientific, and Technical Collaboration
which led to a Czech investment in Polish copper mining in 1961

as well as in a Polish fertilizer plant at Pu^awy.
The Council of Mutual Economic
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Assistance

In January, 19^+9> the Soviet Union forced Czechoslovakia and
Poland to join the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon).
Through Comecon, whose headquarters are located in Moscow, the Soviet
Union maintains her economic hegemony throughout Eastern Europe,
Comecon's original objective was defensive.

'

Just as the

Warsaw Pact was essentially designed to offset NATO, Eastern Europe's
economic organization was instituted with the hope of counter
acting the growing success of the European Economic Community in
Western Europe,

Particularly since 1 9 5 5 1 Comecon's activities have

increasingly reflected the twofold intention of the Soviet leader
ship, namely to unite the Eastern European

states firmly with the

Soviet Union through skillful exploitation

of economic resources

(for example, the Soviet exploitation of Czechoslovakia's uranium
and Poland's coal), and to keep the satellite economies in fair-toprosperous shape to prevent revolutionary upsurges as in 1953-1956
and 1 9 6 8 . 22

As a part of the Comecon agreement, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
and Poland formed "Intermetal" in 196.3 to facilitate cooperation
among the three states in iron and steel production.
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Czechoslovak-Polish Trade Relations
From 19^-8 to 1955 1 the development of Czechoslovak-Polish

trade relations within the realm of manufactured goods grew rapidly.
An even greater increase in trade of manufactured goods occurred
from 1957 to 1 9 6 2 , when the growth level increased two and one-half
times over the preceding five-year period.

In 1969, Poland ranked

third among Czechoslovakia's trading partners, behind the Soviet
Union and the German Democratic Republic.

Czechoslovakia also

ranked third among Poland's trading partners, behind the Soviet
Union and the German Democratic Republic.
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In the thirty-year period since the end of the war, Poland
has evolved from an agricultural-industrial state to an industrialagricultural state as is Czechoslovakia.

The sharp inter-war

period diversity between Czechoslovakia and Poland within the realm
of industrial production has diminished considerably in the post
war period.

(During the inter-war period, Czechoslovakia was one

of Europe's most heavily industrialized states, while Poland
developed only rudimentary industrial growth.)

Because of the

increased emphasis on industrialization in Poland, Polish agricul
tural

exports to Czechoslovakia have decreased significantly, a

fact verified

in the following statistics:

Polish commodities exported to Czechoslovakia:

1.

machines and tools:.

19^-8 (0.5%),

1969(55*2%)

2.

consumer products:

1 9 ^8 (--- ), 196 9

5.

agricultural
products:

19'+8 (26.1%), 196 9 (5.9%)

(15.2%)

5^

Within the realm of Polish exports to Czechoslovakia, the
following finished industrial products are included:

ball bearings,

electrical appliances, mining machinery, cranes, road building
equipment, textile machinery, ships, pumps, agricultural machinery,
commercial tools, electric industrial ovens, precision tools,
automobiles (Polish Fiats), railway cars, and electrical parts.

In

1 9 6 9 , Poland also built a sugar beet processing plant near Hroch'fiv

Tynec for the annual processing of ^,000 tons of sugar beets.
Poland exports the following raw materials to Czechoslovakia:
bituminous coal (approximately two million tons annually), zinc,
caustic and calcine soda, dyes, and cement.
Polish agricultural exports to Czechoslovakia include the
following products:

potatoes, fruits, vegetables, seafood, meat,

and vodka*
Polish consumer goods exported to Czechoslovakia include the
following items:

textiles, sewing machines, furniture, zippers,

sports equipment, bicycles, radios and televisions, refrigerators,
and cosmetics.
Poland has also made available to Czechoslovakia port
facilities in Szczecin as well as free navigation on the Oder River
for 30,000 tons of cargo annually.
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Because the standard of living in Czechoslovakia is about
20 to 25 percent higher than in Poland (See footnote 22.), Czecho
slovakia does not export as many goods to Poland as Poland does to
Czechoslovakia.

Machinery and tools comprise about two-thirds of

Czechoslovakia's exports to Poland.

The machinery and tool products.

55

include the following items:

ball bearings, electrical tools,

mining equipment, textile machinery, machinery for shoe production,
machinery for the manufacture of rubber and artificial products,
automobiles (Czech ^kodas), trucks, buses, medical equipment, and
motorcycles (Jawas), precision tools, industrial equipment, air
compressors, pumps, cranes, and office equipment,
Czechoslovakia exports the following raw materials to
Poland::

crude oil, porcelain clay, magnesite, chemicals, and

cellulose products.
Within the realm of consumer goods, Czechoslovakia exports
the following products to Poland:
ficial jewellery (in 1 9 6 %

shoes, pharmaceuticals, arti

3 * 3 million zlotys in value), cosmetics,

musical instruments, sports equipment, dry goods, and glassware.
On
a

March 2, 1971* in Prague, the Czechs and the Poles

five-year plan (1971-1975) for the exchange of goods.

signed

This five-

year trade agreement foresaw the increase in exchange values of up

2(S

to 73 percent from the previous agreement of 1 9 6 6 -1 9 7 0 .
The "spillover" theory— lack of validity in
th e case of Czechoslovakia and Poland
The

"spillover" theory cited in Chapter I states that

excellent relations between two states in the economic sphere may
"spillover" into the political sphere and lead to political inte
gration.

As the above section indicates, Czechoslovakia and Poland

have enjoyed excellent economic relations since 19^7.

However, the

Czechs and the Poles have remained distant in the political sphere,
and it appears that the political distance will continue to exist.
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Czechoslovakia's and Poland's foreign policies are dictated
from Moscow*

Therefore, despite the fact that the diplomatic

relations between the two satellite states are correct, the old
mutual prejudices and jealousies have remained.

One can conclude

that the "spillover" theory has no validity in the case of
Czechoslovak-Polish relations.
During the period of this chapter (19^5-1967)$ the distance

between the Czechoslovak and Polish governments and people during
the 1956 crisis has already been examined.

That distance repeated

itself during the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia, to be discussed
in the following chapter.
However, other data from the 19^5-1967 period allow one to
conclude that the Czechs and the Poles have remained politically
distant.

The data include the following:

(l)

belated Czechoslovak

endorsement of the Rapacki Plan in 1957, and (2) travel restric
tions between Czechoslovakia and Poland.

Belated Czechoslovak endorsement of the Rapacki Plan
On October 2, 1 9 5 7 1 Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki
proposed before the United Nations General Assembly his plan for a
nuclear-free zone in Central Europe.

The purpose of the plan was

to prevent the German Federal Republic from obtaining atomic weapons.
The proposed zone was to include Czechoslovakia, Poland,
German Democratic Republic, and the German Federal Republic.

the

The

states included in the nuclear-free zone were to pledge, not to
manufacture, maintain or import for their own use, and not to per
mit the location on their territories of nuclear weapons of any type,
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as well as any installations and equipment designed for servicing
nuclear weapons, including missile-launching equipment.

The

nuclear powers at that time (the United States, Great Britain,
France, and the Soviet Union) were also to pledge not to uee
nuclear weapons against the zone.

The United States formally

rejected the plan in October, 1961.
When Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki proposed his plan
for an atom-free zone in Central Europe on October 2, 1957, the
Czechoslovak government showed complete indifference toward the
proposal.

Despite the fact that it was to Czechoslovakia's

advantage to support such a plan in light of Czechoslovakia's
critical geographical situation, the Novotny regime refused to
endorse the Rapacki Plan.

However, after "months of quiet

persuasion" from the Soviet Union, the Czechoslovak government
officially endorsed the Polish proposal on December 14, 1957« 27
It appears that Czechoslovakia's refusal to endorse the
Rapacki Plan verifies the premise that despite the fact that
Czechoslovak-Polish diplomatic relations are correct, the old
Czech and Polish prejudices and jealousies have remained.
Furthermore, one may conclude that Czechoslovakia's endorsement of
the Rapacki Plan did not evolve from a willingness to endorse the
Polish government's attempt to create a nuclear-free zone in
Central Europe, but rather from the Novotny regime's reluctance to
jeopardize relations with its chief ally, the Soviet Union.

Novotny's obedie.nce to the Soviet Union in the case of the
•Rapacki Plan stands as an indication that Czechoslovakia was one of
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the Soviet Union's most faithful Eastern European satellites during
the nineteen-fifties and early nineteen-sixties.

Strong Czecho

slovak loyalty to the Soviet Union during that period evolved from
the historical Czech amity toward Russia.
Travel restrictions between Czechoslovakia and Poland
In 1963, Czechoslovakia and Poland signed an agreement to
allow Czechoslovak and Polish tourists easy access to border resorts
without a passport.

However, in 1965» further travel restrictions

between the two states were imposed.

After the 1968 invasion of

Czechoslovakia, harsher travel restrictions between the two states
were added, and those restrictions have not been relaxed since that
time.

28

Travel between Czechoslovakia and Poland now requires not

only a passport, but also a visa.
The travel restrictions between the two states are a means
by which the Communist regimes in Prague and Warsaw maintain their
power base, by preventing the dissemination of ideas across the
Czechoslovak-Polish border.

The lack of travel between Czechoslovakia

and Poland has had the effect of not allowing greater contact
between the Czechs and the Poles.

Therefore, a subsequent lack of

communication ensues, and the old mutual Czech-Polish prejudices,
jealousies, and misunderstandings are preserved.

This lack of

communication explains in part the general failure of the Czechs to
comprehend the 1956 events in Poland as well as the corresponding
general lack of understanding in Poland concerning the 1968 events
in Czechoslovakia.

The I 968 events in Czechoslovakia are the

subject of the following chapter.
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C H A P T E R

IV

THE ROLE OF THE "PRAGUE SPRING" AND THE 19 6 8 INVASION OF CZECHO
SLOVAKIA IN CZECHOSLOVAK-POLISH RELATIONS
The purpose of this chapter is not to narrate the entire
history of the "Prague Spring" and the subsequent Soviet-led Warsaw
Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Instead, the purpose of this

chapter is primarily to examine the following factors:

(l) the

reasons for Polish participation in the invasion and the Czech reac
tion to that participation,

(2 ) the destruction of the historical

Czech amity toward Russia, and (3) the general lack of protest in
Poland vis-a-vis the Polish government's decision to intervene
militarily in Czechoslovakia.
The Causes of the "Prague Spring", 1956-1967

Protest Among the Intellectuals
After Stalin's death, undercurrents of discontent began to
appear in Czechoslovakia, especially among the writers and intel
lectuals.

In 1956, the Novotny regime crushed resistance through the

dismissals of dissidents from the Party and from employment.
However, by the end of the nineteen-fifties and the middle
of the nineteen-sixties,

the writers and the intellectuals resur

faced to demand greater literary expression in their works.

The

existential philosophy of Sartre, Camus, Heidegger, and Kierkegaard
began to rival Marxist philosophy.

Cabarets, mime shows, and Black

Theatres appeared throughout the country, and the performers spiced
their acts with political criticisms of the Novotny" regime.

Czecho-
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Slovak cinema during the nineteen-sixties also began to experiment

with new techniques and was renowned throughout the world.

Two

Czechoslovak films, Jan Kadar's The Shop on Main Street and Jira
Menzel's Closely Watched Trains, won Oscars as "Best Foreign Film"
in 1964 and 1 9 6 6 , respectively.

1

The Union of Czechoslovak Writers, the Union of Slovak
Writers, and the Union of Slovak Journalists became the spokesmen
of publicly expressed disdain of, and opposition to, the Czechoslo
vak regime.

By 1 9 6 6 , several cultural and literary periodicals had

developed as significant vehicles of party criticism.

The most

famous of these periodicals was Literarni noviny, the forerunner of
the "Prague Spring's" mouthpiece Literarni listy.
The Slovak literary movement developed in the early nineteensixties in an attempt to acquire greater national identification
within the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

The Slovak writers

accentuated Czech wrongs committed against the Slovaks.

(During

the inter-war period, the Czechs treated the Slovaks as second-class
citizens and dominated the bureaucracy in Slovakia.

As a result of

Slovak demands for a separate Slovak state, Slovakia became a quasi
independent state allied to Nazi Germany from 1939 until the Slovak
Uprising in 1944.

Under the I960 Czechoslovak constitution, the

autonomous rights of the Slovak parliament were almost liquidated
and the Bratislava Cabinet was abolished.

Bratislava lost its

status as the capital of Slovakia, and regional authorities in cen
tral Slovakia became directly subordinated to the central government
in Prague.)

Intellectual ferment among both Slovak and Czech writers
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culminated at the June, 1967, Fourth Congress of the Writers' Union
where the writers blasted the government for its anti-Israeli stance
and demanded the termination of censorship in literature.

2

It was at the Congress of the Writers' Union that Ludvik
Vaculik denounced the Party for lack of leadership and for hypoc
risy.

(In June, 1968, Vaculxk \vrote the famous declaration "Two

Thousand Words" which demanded further democratization in Czecho
slovakia during the "Prague Spring".)

In his speech, Vaculik

unknowingly predicted the horror and apathy of post-invasion
Czechoslovakia:

"If the government is allowed to stand permanently,

the citizens will suffer.

Not all will lose their lives, but the

fall of many will be followed by the relapse of perhaps the whole
nation into fear, political apathy, and civic resignation.

. . . "

3

.Czechoslovak Economic Stagnation
In 1963, the Czechoslovak national income dropped by 2.8
percent, the volume of output by 0 . 7 percent and productivity by
1.4 percent in relation to the previous year.

Even though the

third Five-Year Plan for 1 9 6 1 -1 9 6 5 was supposed to have raised the
national income by 42 percent, industrial output by 36 percent and
agricultural output by 22 percent, the period revealed that the
national income grew by only 10 percent and industrial output by
29 percent, while ag-ricultural output dropped by 0.4 percent.+
Economic reform became obvious.
In 1964, the Party approved some principles of reform
V

advanced by Czechoslovakia's foremost economist, Ota Sik, the head
of the Economic Institute of the Academy of Sciences.

v
Sik deplored
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the blind orthodoxy which favored investment in heavy industry
regardless of costs, the neglect and sacrifice of quality to quantity
in industrial production, the unwillingness to experiment with profit
incentives and autonomy of decision-making at the plant level, and
the indifference to technological-scientific innovation and labor
productivity in the labor economy.
Sik argued that Czechoslovakia had to make more extensive
use of profit incentive, autonomy of decision-making at the plant
level, and foreign trade.

He believed that Czechoslovakia could

achieve more by buying machinery and selling consumer goods abroad
rather than vice versa.

Trade with the West was a major orientation

of Sik's economic plan.
1/

Sik favored increased trade with the German Federal Republic,
but he did not advocate Czechoslovakia’s withdrawal from Comecon.
&ik designed his economic reforms to ameliorate the stagnated economy
in Czechoslovakia through the adoption of economic principles suited
specifically to Czechoslovakia's conditions.
V

However, Sik's advocacy of closer relations with the German
Federal Republic provoked widespread consternation among the conser
vative Communist regimes in Poland, the German Democratic Republic,
and the Soviet Union.

Gomu^ka, Ulbricht, and Brezhnev, respectively,

felt that Czechoslovak rapprochement with the P’ederal Republic would
weaken both Comecon and the Warsaw Pact, destroy Soviet hegemony in
Eastern Europe, and undermine the unpopular GomuXka and Ulbricht
regimes.

The perceived threat of the German Federal Republic was

one of the factors which precipitated the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
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Prague Student Demonstration
As a result of a governmental decision to employ plastics
instead of copper in electrical cables in the Strahov student dormi
tories in Prague, students suffered from both a lack of light for
study and a lack of heat.

Frequent written protests accomplished

nothing.
During the evening of October 30, 1967, the students in the
Strahov dormitory complex staged a demonstration to protest against
the lack of electricity and heat.

About 2,500 students marched

through the.streets of the Strahov district in Prague carrying
candles and shouting "We want light."

The police, who thought that

the demonstration was against the Central Committee which was in
extraordinary session on that particular evening, attacked the student
demonstrators.

Students were beaten with truncheons, tear gas was

used, and several students were hospitalized.^

Even though the

police quickly suppressed the student demonstration, it proved to be
the death knoll for the antiquated Novotny regime.
Thus, Slovak nationalist grievances, demands for increased
literary expression, economic stagnation, and a brief student demon
stration brought an end to Novotny's lengthy rule in Czechoslovakia.
On January 1, 1968, Novotny addressed the Central Committee for the
last time as First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party.
On January 6 , 1 9 6 8 , Alexander Dub£ek, the former First Secretary of
the Slovak Communist Party and a compromise choice, was elected
First Secretary to replace Novotny.

Dubcek became the first Slovak

to hold the position of First Secretary of the national party.

On
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March 22, 1968, Novotny was also forced to abdicate the presidency
of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

General Ludvik Svobpda

replaced Novotny as president and served in that function until
May, 1975.
In the same manner that popular revolt, literary criticism
of the regime, demands for increased freedom of expression, and
economic stagnation in Poland resulted in GomuXka's coming to power
in 1956♦ so Slovak demands for increased autonomy, literary criti
cism of the regime*

demands for increased freedom of expression,

and economic stagnation in Czechoslovakia brought Dub^ek to power
in 1968.

If popular dissent had not existed, one can assume that

neither GomuXka nor Dubtfek, both Communist reformers, would have
come to power at all.

The conservative Communist dictators Bierut

and Novotny possessed only one ambition which was to preserve their
power base at any cost.

Their subsequent losses of power resulted

from their refusal not only to liberalize the Communist system in
their respective states, but also from their wanton contempt and
disregard for popular demands for increased freedom of expression
and an improved standard of living.

Therefore, even though GomuXka

and Dubcek attempted to reform the system from within the confines
of the Communist Party, they secured their positions of power only
as a direct result of popular revolts within their respective states.
Furthermore, their reforms resulted from popular demands for
increased democratization of the Communist system of government.
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The "Prague Spring;"
Dubcek* s coming to power in Czechoslovakia marked a new era
in the history of both Czechoslovakia and the world Communist move
ment.

During the eight month period from January until the invasion

of Czechoslovakia on the night of August 20, 1968, Czechoslovak
citizens enjoyed their greatest breath of freedom since the^ 19^8
coup d'etat.

In an attempt to create "socialism with a human face"

in Czechoslovakia, the Dubcek forces, pushed by widespread popular
demands, introduced innovations into the Communist system of govern
ment which not even Gomu/ka had permitted during the brief "Polish
October" of 1956.
The most important innovation was the removal of press
censorship in June, 1968.

Because of that decision, the Czechoslovak

press became a forum for widespread political debate.

Criticism of

i

the Communist government during the Stalinist period and popular
demands for an official clarification of Jan Masaryk's 19^-8 death
appeared in the uncensored Czechoslovak press.

Political discussions

in the press also examined the possibilities of a multi-party
system, a parliamentary opposition, and completely free elections.

The Dubcek government abolished the Czechoslovak secret
police apparatus early in the period.

The government also revoked

travel restrictions for Czechoslovak citizens, and many Czechs and
Slovaks visited the V/est during the period of the reforms.
Political interest groups developed, the most famous of which
was K231, a group of former political prisoners.

KAN, the Club of

Involved Non-Party Members, was also formed to demand further
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democratization in Czechoslovakia from the Dubcek government*
However, the Czechoslovak Communist Party refused to endorse the
existence of the contesting political entities.
Spontaneity and good will marked the 1968 May Day parade in
Prague.

An estimated ^00,000 Czechs and enthusiastic foreigners,

in Czechoslovakia to observe the reform movement, crowded the streets
in a disorderly fashion.
For the first time since 19^7, Czech residents of Plzen
raised an American flag and played The Star-Spangled Banner in the
city square to honor the twenty-third anniversary of the American
liberalization of their city from the Nazis on May 6 , 19^5*

n

Dubcek attempted to conduct a middle-of-the-road course in
his reforms of the system,

However, popular demands to accelerate

the reforms complicated the situation for Dubcek.

The most

striking demand for the continuation of democratization in Czecho
slovakia was Vaculfk's "Two Thousand Words".

On June 28, 1968, the

Presidium condemned the declaration as counterrevolutionary, but
later reversed its decision.
The Presidium's condemnation of the "Two Thousand Words"
indicated that a cogent conservative element remained in Czechoslo
vakia to pressure Dubcek to maintain a neutral course and not to
accelerate the reforms of the "Prague Spring".

Dubcek's middle-of-

the-road policies satisfied neither the liberals nor the
conservatives.
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The Official Polish Reaction to the "Prague Spring"
During the May Day celebration in Warsaw, GomuXka, the former
champion of "democratic" Communism in Poland and at that time
embroiled in a bitter fight with Mieczys^aw Moczar over the leader
ship of the United Polish Workers' Party, attacked the Czechoslovak
reformers as "alleged champions of freedom and democracy" who are in
fact "reactionaries and backward elements, preachers of anti
communist ideology, waging a struggle against socialism not only
with us, but also with other socialist countries."

8

Out of fear that the Czechoslovak reform movement would
prove to be contagious in Poland, the Polish government commenced on
May 5, 1968, a virulent press attack on the reform movement in
Czechoslovakia.
In the Polish press attacks on the Czechoslovak reforms,
the government played upon the traditional Polish prejudice that the
Czechs are pro-German.

This prejudice has evolved from the fact

that many Czechs speak German, and also because Czech culture and
language were almost liquidated during the three hundred years of
Austrian hegemony in Bohemia.

The Poles have always resented the

Czechs for the latter's national preference for passivity when
confronted with a more powerful foe.

The small number of Czechs

who perished during the Second World War, compared to the enormous
Polish loss of six million persons, rekindled the Polish prejudice
that the Czechs are pro-German because the Poles felt that the
Czechs had collaborated with the Nazis to remain alive.
✓
The Polish press intentionally misinterpreted Sik's goal to
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augment Czechoslovakia's trade relations with the German Federal
Republic.

The Polish press reported to its Polish audience that

the Czechs and the Slovaks wished to withdraw from Comecon and the
Warsaw Pact which would have left Poland vulnerable to a perceived
West German attack from the south.

(The memories of Nazi occupa

tion and Nazi crimes in Poland still predominate among the Poles,
and the perceived threat of the German Federal Republic is stronger
than is the Federal Republic's actual strength.)
The following interpretation of the events in Czechoslovakia
is taken from a document circulated among members of the United
Polish Workers' Party.

The document accentuates the alleged

Czechoslovak withdrawal from the socialist bloc, Czech anti-Polish
sentiments, and the perceived threat to the socialist movement:
On May 6 , the Ambassador of the Polish People's
Republic in Prague • . . sent a note to the Czechoslovak
government protesting against the anti-Polish and anti
socialist character of the Czechoslovak press, radio,
and television.
Enemies of the Polish People's Republic
and of our Party . . . are an expression of anti-social
ist strength which has appeared in the last few months.
The direction of the Czechoslovak Communist Party has
become fragmented. . . . The revisionist group wishes to
liquidate the people's government, to return Czecho
slovakia to a liberal-bourgeois form of government, and
to remove Czechoslovakia from the socialist camp and
ally her with the German Federal Republic . . .
It is clear that the events in Czechoslovakia
are not exclusively the internal affair of a brother
country. . . . The course of events in Czechoslovakia
is of crucial importance to the security of Poland and
the other socialist countries as well as of the position
of socialist strength in Europe. . . . (May 7, 1968)
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The Polish Student Riots of January-March, 1968
Background, 1956-1968
A few months after having taken power, GomuXka saw the
Stalinists as less harmful to him than those who demanded the com
plete liquidation of Stalinism in Poland.

In October, 1956,

GomuXka did not change the entire composition of the Polish govern
ment because almost all of the Stalinists from the nineteenforties and nineteen-fifties

remained in power.

Therefore,

Stalinism in Poland was not liquidated, but rather only weakened.
During the succeeding years, many of the Stalinists removed
from power in the "Polish October" of 1956 returned to their former
positions and governed as they had previously.

They did not call

themselves Stalinists, but simply changed their methods of beha
vior.

Therefore, Poland entered her period of "neo-Stalinism"

under Gomu^ka, the man with whom the Polish people had had so much
faith in his being a "democratic" Communist.
Economic difficulties also became prevalent in Poland about
1959*

The economic uncertainties caused a great deal of animosity

among the Poles toward their government.

During the nineteen-

sixties, the Polish economic situation worsened considerably.

The

costs of the most important staples (apartments, communications,
meat, and bread) all rose in price.

Poland's rapid post-war

economic development was h a l t e d . ^
The strength of the Polish secret police also began to
redevelop after 1956.

The secret police became an integral part of
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the Party and the governmental structure and appeared in all levels
of Polish political, economic, and cultural life.'*"'*'
The neo-Stalinists identified socialism with the total
control of each individual citizen.

The neo-Stalinist ideal was to

create a totalitarian society, a police state.

The man in control

of the internal security network was Mieczys/aw Moczar.
Moczar began to interfere in the operation of areas not of
his direct concern, e. g . , decisions about Polish export quotas.
Moczar's domination of and influence within the governmental
structure provoked consternation and numerous protests among Polish
writers, intellectuals, and students.
Party elites guided the Polish government, and the secret
police and Party apparatus supported the elites.

All of these

groups were not concerned with the interests of the Polish working
class.

The elites were in total control of the Polish economic

situation, while the Polish population had absolutely no influence
on any decisions.

The Polish working class lost all control of

events in Poland and was reduced to a role of labor strength.

12

The elites opposed the notion of democratizing the system
because it would have led to a limitation of their absolute power.
Membership in the elitist structure was not guaranteed through
knowledge, skill, or moral qualifications; the most crucial factor
for consideration was loyalty.

Therefore, it was not surprising

that those persons who belonged to the elite in Poland feared the
idea of democratization which was taking place in Czechoslovakia
in 1 9 6 8 .

Gomu^ka regarded the events in Czechoslovakia as a genuine

7^
threat to his. own power base in Poland,
The March Events
The March events of 1968 in Poland resulted directly from
a power struggle between Gomu/ka and Moczar within the hierarchy
of the United Polish Workers' Party.

The personal game-playing

occurred because of efforts to improve the political and economic
situation in Poland.

However, the Polish people's increasing

distrust of the governing apparatus became evident.

Numerous voices

of protest began to appear within the intellectual community which
demanded greater freedom of expression.

The intellectuals and

writers demanded widespread economic reforms and the removal of
the Party .from the governmental structure.
The spark came in January, 1 9 6 8 .

In January, the government,

influenced by the Moczar forces, banned further performances of
Dziady (The Forefathers' Eve), Adam Mickiewicz's play about Poland's
fight for independence from Tsarist Russia and a masterpiece of
Polish literature.

The play's production was ordered stopped because

the anti-Russian tone of the play was considered to be offensive
to the Soviet Embassy in Warsaw.

However, this Moczar accusation

was a blatant falsehood because Moczar's forces, involved in the
power struggle against Gomu^ka, prepared the withdrawal of Dziady
as a means by which to provoke demonstrations against the GomuXka
government.
University students protested fiercely against the govern
ment's decision to ban the performances of Dziady; they entered the
streets of Warsaw and demanded the liquidation of censorship.

The

students did not demand any changes within the economic or the
political spheres.

Several students listed on a previously prepared

list were arrested.
The Warsaw student population stood in the defense of their
arrested colleagues.

Three thousand one hundred forty-five Warsaw

students signed a letter of protest addressed to the Sejm (parlia
ment).

The letter demanded the end of censorship and the release

of the arrested students, but the Se.jm did nothing.
The official Polish press attributed the student protests
to "hooliganism" and to nationalistic and anti-Soviet sentiments,
thereby legitimizing the students' arrests.

14

In March, 1968, two students at Warsaw University were
arrested, and no reasons for the arrests were given.

On March 8 ,

1968, Warsaw University students gathered on the main square of
the university to protest against the illegal arrests.

An agree

ment to disperse was achieved between the students and the rector,
Professor Rybicki.

As the students began to leave the university

square, the police entered the university grounds and began to
beat and arrest the students.

The illegal police attack on the

Warsaw University students ignited further manifestations of
student solidarity in Warsaw which in turn provoked student riots
at other universities throughout Poland.
The Warsaw students began to shout "Long live Czechoslovakia!,
"Poland awaits her own Dubcek!," and "Freedom!"

These .chants

indicated that the Polish demonstrators were aware of the growing
liberalization in Czechoslovakia despite an almost complete blackout
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on news of any significance from Prague.

15

However, the liberalization program in Czechoslovakia did
not provoke the student riots in Warsaw and later throughout
Poland.

The riots were carefully planned within the higher eche

lons of the internal security system, specifically by Moczar.

When

the students demanded their "own Dubcek," they were not supporting
the Czechs out of any feelings of friendship for the Czechs.
Polish amity simply does not exist.

Czech-

Instead, the Polish students

wished only to possess the entity which the Czechs possessed, e. g . ,
freedom of expression without the threat of police reprisals.

The Polish student population in March, 1968, was not
prepared for the riots and protests which the Moczar forces had
prepared in advance.

During the initial stages of the March events,

the students demanded only the removal of censorship in Poland, the
right to show Dziady in Warsaw, and the liberation of their
imprisoned friends.
ment.

They forwarded no other demands to the govern

Unfortunately, the workers and other Polish citizens did

not support the students during their quickly suppressed protest.
In conclusion, there was one other result of the March
events.

In order to explain the March events to the Polish people,

the government found a scapegoat, the Jewish population in Poland.
Blaming the Jews, for the outbreak of student riots throughout the
country,

the government began to persecute Jewish citizens in Poland

in scenes reminiscent of the terror the Jews endured during the
Nazi occupation of Poland.

The government also forced Jews from

their jobs and purged them from the Party.

Because of the perse
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cution, 20,000 Polish Jews applied for emigration to Israel and
other countries.

The purge- also affected Gomu/ka's own Jewish wife,

who emigrated to Israel.^
The Invasion of Czechoslovakia
The Termination of the Historical Czech Amity toward Russia
After threats and then promises to honor Czechoslovakia's
sovereignty (the Warsaw Ultimatum, the Bratislava Conference, and
the meeting at Cierna-nad-Tisou), troops from the Soviet Union,
Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, and Bulgaria
entered Czechoslovakia on the night of August 20, 1 9 6 8 .

The threat

of democratic socialism in Czechoslovakia and the perceived threat
of West German "revanchism" in Eastern Europe precipitated the
invasion.

The Soviet Union later defended the invasion with the

Brezhnev Doctrine, which states that the Soviet Union has the right
and the obligation to intervene in the internal affairs of another
socialist state when socialism is threatened in that particular
state.

The Brezhnev Doctrine is in Appendix B.
President Svoboda ordered the Czechoslovak army not to

mobilize to defend Czechoslovakia against the aggressors.

Further

more, he requested that Czechoslovak citizens not resist the
invading troops.

However, resistance, both active and passive, did

occur and the invading troops became rapidly demoralized.

On the

first day of the invasion, eighteen innocent Czechs were killed and
307 wounded in Prague alone.

17

During the August 20 evening meeting of the Presidium at
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Hradcany Castle, Dub£ek was informed about the treacherous Warsaw
Pact invasion of his homeland.
famous lament::
loved Russia.

It was then that he uttered his

"This is my own personal tragedy,

I have always

I have devoted my entire life to co-operating with
-j g

the Soviet Union, and this is what they have done to me!"
Given the traditional Czech and Slovak admiration for
Russia, Dubtfek's tragic statement is not difficult to understand.
The Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia obliterated
the traditional Czech amity toward Russia.

Many Czechs watched

in horror as Russian troops murdered innocent family members and
friends.

Russia's betrayal of Czechoslovakia was too perverse for

many Czechs and Slovaks such as Dubcek to comprehend.
The following statements are examples of Czech anti-Russian
graffiti found on Prague buildings.
the Czechs' hatred for.the Russians:

They reveal the intensity of
RUSSIAN CIRCUS IN TOWN!

DO

NOT FEED THE ANIMALS.; THE GERMANS WANTED US FOR ONLY ONE THOU
SAND YEARS ; THE RUSSIANS FOREVER.; HOME, DOGS!
BREZHNEV!
WANTED:

OUR NATION VEEPS.;

COMPARED TO YOU GENGHIS KHAN NEVER EXISTED.; EXCHANGE
SOVIET-CZECHOSLOVAK FRIENDSHIP FOR ANY OTHER PORNOGRAPHY.;

CALLING DR. BARNARD!

HELP!!!

DR. BREZHNEV HAS JUST TRANSPLANTED

THE HEART OF EUROPE INTO THE BEHIND OF RUSSIA.; EVEN HITLER INVADED
CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN DAYLIGHT.; PRotf?=POCHEMU?=POURQUOI?=WHY?19
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Czech Reaction to Polish Participation in the
Invasion of Czechoslovakia
In light of the destruction of the traditional Czech amity
toward Russia, an historical issue of contention between the Czechs
and the Poles, an opportunity for Czech-Polish rapprochement
existed.

Cooperation among Czech and Polish intellectuals did

occur briefly in 1 9 6 8 .

Those intellectuals included writers

Goldsttlcker, Kohout, Prochazka, and Lustig among the Czechs, and
novelists Andrzejewski and Mrozek among the Poles.
However, that opportunity perished because Polish troops
also participated in the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Two Polish

military actions in Czechoslovakia within the span of thirty years
(1938 and 1 9 6 8 ) have been bitter pills for the Czechs to swallow.
Polish participation in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia only
reinforced traditional Czech prejudice toward Poland.

Polish tourists in Czechoslovakia reported that Czechs
treated them with overt hostility.

According to Radio Warsaw

(August 27, 1968), Czechs stoned Polish buses and cars and insulted their passengers.

Radio Warsaw declared:

"Tourists speaking Polish

risk being ostentatiously refused service in the shops.

The

extraordinary thing is that German-speaking people get fast and
polite service.

Instances of thefts of cars marked PI (Polska

Ludowa, the international automotive insignia for Poland) are
,,20
increasing."
Demoralization and malaise developed quickly among the
Polish troops in Czechoslovakia because the troops felt that they
had no right to enter Czechoslovak territory within the confines of

military aggression.
returned to Poland.

Several Polish soldiers even deserted and
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In the Czech town of Ji£xn, two lonely,

demoralized, and drunken Polish soldiers opened fire on two local
couples sitting on a park bench.

They killed one of the boys,

wounded one of the girls, killed the other boy's mother and wounded
his father when they came out to see what was happening, killed a
Polish soldier who tried to quell the slaughter, and wounded
another Polish soldier, a Czech soldier, and a woman in a passing
car.

This unprovoked, unnecessary, and tragic Polish slaughter

became known as "The Ji£xn Massacre of 1 9 6 8 . " ^

Polish Reaction to Polish Participation in the
Invasion of Czechoslovakia
The repressions in Poland which took place after the March
events broke the back of the Polish opposition which had looked to
the reforms in Czechoslovakia with hope and expectation.

The post-

March repressions eliminated the possibility of a widespread
emotional response to the invasion of Czechoslovakia as was found
in Poland during the 1956 Hungarian Uprising.

The average Pole had

mixed feelings such as bewilderment, shame, or relief that the
German Federal Republic would not threaten Polish security.

Tra

ditional anti-Czech prejudices and antipathies also played a role
in explaining the general passivity of the Polish population.

following comment was often heard in Poland:
have, had it as well!"

23

The

"At last the Czechs

This statement refers to the fact that

the Russians finally suppressed freedom in Czechoslovakia, as they
had done previously in Poland and in Hungary.
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Protests against Poland's participation in the invasion of
Czechoslovakia came mostly from the most articulate and best
educated strata of Polish society, the students and the intellectu
als*

The protesters expressed themselves through the distribution

of pro-Czechoslovak leaflets which attacked the Polish government
on moral grounds, much as American students protested against
United States involvement in Vietnam on moral grounds.

The

following leaflet accentuated Poland's disgrace in the eyes of the
world because of her participation in the invasion of Czechoslo
vakia:'
On the night of August 20-21, 1968, the armies
of Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, Poland,
Hungary, and the Soviet Union commenced criminal
aggression g>n socialist Czechoslovakia.
Poland's
participation in that criminal aggression is a conse
quence of the politics realized during the past few
years in our country.
The same forces which massacred
the workers in Poznan and bloodily crushed the revolu
tion in Hungary in 1956, destroyed the achievements of
the "Polish October" through the practice of anti
socialist policies, the forces which in March of this
year brutally suppressed the students— today wishes to
silence the democratic process in Czechoslovakia.
The Polish army's occupation of Zaolzie during
Hitler's partition of Czechoslovakia was shameful.
The participation of the Polish army in the present
aggression is also shameful.
Shame on the aggressors!
Czechoslovakia, you are not alone!
The occupation of. the Czechoslovak Socialist
Republic threatens peace in the world and is a return
to Stalinism and a blow to the hopes of democracy in
Poland.
Shame on the Polish uniform!
Boycott Poland
in the entire world!
Poles, demand the withdrawal of
the occupation army from Czechoslovakia and the
termination of interference in Czechoslovakia's inter
nal affairs.
We demand democratic socialism and
freedom!
The affair of the Czechs and the Slovaks is
also our affair.
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The invasion of Czechoslovakia reaffirmed the tragedy of
Eastern Europe--the failure of the small Eastern European countries
to understand their mutual dependence.

In 1 9 6 8 , as in 1956, as in

1938, as in 1 9 1 9 -1 9 2 0 , petty quarrels, divisiveness, and terri
torial ambitions among the Eastern European nations contributed to
their national tragedies.

Any attack on one or more of the

Eastern European states by an outside power such as Germany or
Russia has:been used by the other Eastern European nations to
advance their own interests at the expense of the victim(s).

In

19.19, during a period of Polish weakness, Czech troops entered
Poland to acquire control of the important coal mining region at
Teschen.

In 1920, during the Polish-Soviet war, the Czechs

refused to allow the transit of French arms to Poland.

In 1938,

Poland and Hungary participated in the dismemberment of Czecho
slovakia.

The bloodbath in Hungary In 1956 provoked widespread

sympathy in Poland, but only indifference in Czechoslovakia.

Both

the Hungarians and the Poles attempted to break away from the
Soviet yoke in 1956, but failed.

Should the Czechs and the Slovaks

have succeeded in 1968 when the others had not?
The aggressive, short-sighted, and brutal actions of the
Eastern European authoritarian governments have been reinforced
time and time again by the negative attitudes of the Eastern
European peoples for their neighbors.

Mutual Czech-Polish

animosities and cultural prejudices represent only one of those
negative attitudes.

Unfortunately, the role of Polish participa

tion in the invasion of Czechoslovakia was to reinforce the

traditional Czech enmity toward the Poles
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CONCLUSION
The preceding chapters of this study have attempted to show
that the Czechs and the Poles command a lengthy history of mutual
cultural prejudice, distaste, jealousy, animosity, and misunder
standing.

All of these factors have existed for centuries, even

prior to the foundations of the Czechoslovak Republic and the Polish
Republic in 1918.

Despite the imposition of Communism in both

states after the end of the Second World War, the Czech and Polish
peoples as well as their corresponding governments have continued
to manifest their negative attitudes through either overt hostility
or total indifference toward the other.

Relations between the

Czechs and the Poles are somewhat analogous to relations between the
Americans and the Canadians, e. g . , proper but distant.

The lack

of an open border between the two satellite states has ensured the
preservation of the ancient animosities and mutual cultural
prejudices.

The poor relations between the Czechs and the Poles

have continued to exist after the invasion of Czechoslovakia which
reinforced traditional Czech enmity toward the Poles.
The Czech Reaction to Gierek*s Liberalization in Poland
On December 13, 1970, the GomuXka government announced its
decision to raise food prices.

On December l^f, workers in Gdansk,

rioted to protest against the decision.

Riots in the other Baltic

port cities of Gdynia, Szczecin, and Ebl^g followed the Gdansk riots.
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On December 15, GomuXka, in an effort to preserve his power base,
committed a grave error and ordered that tanks suppress the revolt.
On December 18, GomuXka suffered a minor stroke during an argu
ment within the Politboro with members opposed to his decision to
employ force.

On December 19, after seven hours of debate, the

Politboro requested that GomuXka resign.

On December 20, the VII

Plenary session of the United Polish Workers• Party Central
Committee formally elected Edward Gierek First Secretary.

Gierek

then appeared on television, publicly acknowledged the leadership's
mistakes, and promised a revision of economic and other policies.
As a result, strikes and disturbances died down and protests planned
in other cities were cancelled.'*'
The riots, which brought Gierek, a Communist reformer, to
power in 1970 reinforce

the premise that popular dissent or revolt

in Eastern Europe are the only means available to the Eastern
European peoples to liberalize the Communist system of government.
This has consistently proven to be the case.

However,

the Czechs

and the Poles have opted for different means of protest to accom
plish their goals.

The Poles have usually chosen violence, while

the Czechs have preferred passive resistance.

Both nations have

succeeded in overthrowing conservative Communist regimes, although
the threat or actuality of Soviet military intervention has deprived
the two peoples of the complete democratization of the Communist
system of government.
In its first year, the new Gierek leadership rescinded the
previously announced price increases and instituted a price freeze,

gave pay increases to the lowest paid workers, postponed an unpopu
lar wage reform, and eased the farmers' obligatory sales to the
state.

(About 80 to 85 percent of Poland's agricultural land is

in private hands.)

Gierek also declared his intention to continue

good governmental relations with Poland's powerful Roman Catholic
hierarchy.

Furthermore, he made concessions to popular sentiments,

among them to rebuild the royal palace in Warsaw which had been
destroyed during the war.

GomuXka had refused to rebuild the

palace because it represented the Polish aristocracy.
Gierek has also turned heavily to the West for trade,
investments, and technology.

Over three hundred Western industrial

concerns have located plants in Poland under agreements that permit
production to be sold in Western markets to repay Poland's enormous
indebtedness to the West--no.w around two billion dollars.
However, Gierek has sometimes been ambivalent concerning
his reforms of Poland's Communist system of government.

The Soviet

invasion of Czechoslovakia stands as a constant reminder that Gierek
must remain cautious for fear of Soviet intervention into his own
+
2
country.
In April, 1 9 6 9 , Alexander Dubcek lost his position as First
Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party because of the "human
torch" January, 1969» death of Jan Palach who was protesting against
Soviet interference in Czechoslovakia's internal affairs, and the
anti-Soviet riots which erupted in Prague and other Czechoslovak
cities in March, 1969t as a result of the Czechoslovak victory over
the Soviet Union at the World Hockey Championships in Stockholm.
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The Soviet leadership replaced Dubcek with Gustav Husak, a conser
vative Slovak lawyer who had spent six years in prison during the
Stalinist period for "Slovak nationalism".
Husak then set out to destroy the reforms of the Dubcek
era and to return Czechoslovakia to a close alliance with the
Soviet Union.

He ordered increased police surveillance of all

liberals involved in the "Prague Spring".

Even though the December

riots in Poland appear to have caused only indifference among the
people in Czechoslovakia, the Gierek liberalization provoked wide
spread consternation within the conservative Czechoslovak regime,
composed of former Novotnyites who returned to power after the
Invasion.

On February 2.5, 1971, Kaska, the Minister of the

Interior, told members of his ministry about the "dangerous
developments" in Poland and said that if Gierek failed to master
the situation, "international assistance," e. g . , military intervention, would be necessary.

3

Kaska's reaction to the Gierek liberalization in Poland
confirms once again the Marshall R. Singer hypothesis stated in
Chapter I.

The hypothesis deals with the role of the elites in

two weak Communist states (A and B) which are equally dependent on
a strong third state (X).

The hypothesis states that if the elites

of weak state B hold a political perception different from that of
strong state X, the likelihood is that the international political
behavior of the elites in weak state A will more closely resemble
and support the political behavior of X than they will of the
political behavior of B.
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In 1956» GomuXka (B) deviated from the conservative
Marxist-Leninist norm, and Novotny (A) did not support him because
he feared that the new "Titoism" in Poland would prove to be
contagious in Czechoslovakia.

Therefore, he closed the Czecho

slovak- Polish border and jammed Polish radio broadcasts.

Moreover,

Novotny supported the Soviet elite's (X) threats against GomuXka's
government as well as its simultaneous suppression of the Hungarian
Uprising.
In 1968, GomuXka and Ulbricht (A) feared the liberalization
of the Dubcek government (B) in Czechoslovakia.

They, along with

the Hungarian and Bulgarian elites, supported the Brezhnev regime
(X) through their participation in the military aggression against
Czechoslovakia on August 20, 1 9 6 8 .

The elite's fear of a loss of

their absolute power through democratization of the Communist
system of government precipitated the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
In 1971, the conservative elites in Czechoslovakia (A),
then and now staunch supporters of a close"Czechoslovak alliance
with the Soviet. U nion, criticized sharply Gierek's liberalization
in Poland.

Out of fear that Gierek's liberal ideas might spread to

Czechoslovakia, the conservative Czechoslovak elites even referred
to the possibility of "international assistance" to suppress Polish
liberalism.
The above facts concerning the conservative Eastern European
elites vis-^-vis the Soviet Union confirm Singer's hypothesis.
Because the conservative Eastern European elites are willing to
support the Soviet Union to suppress any liberal tendencies within
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another Eastern European state, Soviet

hegemony in Eastern Europe

has been maintained.

elites fear that any

The conservative

liberalization within Eastern Europe will undermine their absolute
power base.

The brutality of the conservative Eastern European

elites, demonstrated in their suppression of liberalization in
other Eastern European states, has also been consistently
reinforced by the negative attitudes and indifference of the
Eastern European peoples for their neighbors.
Current Developments in Czechoslovakia and
Material well-being may seduce

in Poland

some Czechs and Slovaks to

overlook their hatred of the Soviet-imposed post-invasion Husak
regime in Czechoslovakia.

Likewise, the rising standard of living

in Poland under the quasi-liberal Gierek regime may seduce some
Poles to overlook the Polish government's imprisonment of those
Poles who rioted in June, 1976.

(See Chapter I.)

Ho\irever, the

drive to democratize the system and the thirst for greater freedom
of expression will not die among the peoples within the two
countries under study in this work.

The current Charter 77 movement

in Czechoslovakia and the dissident movement in Poland led by
Jerzy Andrzejewski, Poland's most eminent contemporary novelist,
indicate this fact.

However, it is the opinion of the author that

the post-Helsinki dissidence throughout Eastern Europe (except
Bulgaria) and the Soviet Union is not interrelated.

The Helsinki

Declaration has acted as a rallying point for dissidents in each
individual state to press each Eastern European regime to honor its
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Helsinki commitments through the granting of greater freedom of
expression as well as through the respecting of fundamental human
rights.
Poles enjoy increased freedom of expression under Gierek,
but the shortages of meat and sugar remain national scandals and
are the source of much popular dissatisfaction with the Gierek
regime.

On the contrary, Czechoslovakia enjoys the second highest

standard of living in the entire socialist bloc, having been
overtaken in recent years by the German Democratic Republic.

For

many years Czechoslovakia enjoyed the title of "showcase" of
socialism.
Since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Czechs have become
increasingly more materialistic through their possession of
automobiles and summer cottages to which they escape frequently
from the heat and political repression of the larger cities.
stores and meat shops are also well-stocked with goods.

The

Therefore,

the Czechs do not sympathize with the Poles' economic difficulties.
However, contrary to the Poles who have been enjoying greater
freedom since 1970, the Czechs have encountered the horror of
post-invasion "normalization", e. g . , the increasing loss of their
personal freedom proportional to their increasing rise in materialism.
The Czechs feel that they have been universally betrayed not only
by their socialist allies in Eastern Europe and especially by their
traditional ally, the Soviet Union, but also by the West.
spread despondency exists in Czechoslovakia today.

k

Wide-
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The Party in Czechoslovakia has had an increasingly more
difficult time in coercing younger Czechs and Slovaks to join the
Party since the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia.

The young in

Poland have also been reluctant to join the Party which has become
increasingly the fortress of the older and more conservative Party
members.

The Polish youth demanded their own Dubcek in 1968 and

opposed their government's decision to intervene militarily in
Czechoslovakia.

Meanwhile, the Czech youth saw Polish and Russian

soldiers murder their innocent brothers, sisters, parents, and
friends.

Polish participation in the invasion of Czechoslovakia

will most likely prevent the Czech and Polish youths from forming
a common front to demand the democratization of the Communist
system within their respective states.

Polish participation in

the invasion of Czechoslovakia rejuvinated traditional Czech
animosity- toward the entire Polish nation as the negative Czech
reaction to the Polish tourists in Czechoslovakia at the time of
the invasion indicates.

The memory of the Polish troops' killing

of Czech citizens in 1968 will die hard among Czech youth.

An

excellent opportunity for Czech-Polish rapprochement has appar
ently perished.
There is widespread fear throughout. Czechoslovakia and
Poland of Soviet military intervention as in Hungary in 19.56 and
Czechoslovakia in 1968 to suppress any popular revolts against the
Communist regimes in power.

The Brezhnev Doctrine still leaves

open the question as to what deviations are allowed in Eastern
Europe, and as to whether the Soviet regime would be willing to

9^
embarrass itself in world opinion again.
Given the current emphasis on detente and the Helsinki
Declaration which guarantees that each sovereign signatory in
Europe will honor the sovereignty of the other signatories, the
likelihood is minimal that the Soviet regime would embarrass
itself again and intervene militarily in the internal affairs of
an Eastern European state.

However, the perceived fear of Soviet

intervention dampens the quest for greater democratization of the
Communist system of government.

Gierek treads as lightly as does

the Polish opposition.
In Poland, widespread consternation exists concerning the
Gierek regime's lack of either a political or an economic solution
to Poland’s economic difficulties.

The Polish writer in the

L'Expreas article cited in Chapter I states that a possible
insurrection could erupt at any moment in Poland.

However, it is

the opinion of the author that most Poles do not desire a national
insurrection for fear of Soviet intervention.

This premise is

substantiated in the following statement by a prominent Polish
dissident:

"We are always afraid of one thing.

Czechoslovakia on our soil.

We don't want a

It would be a real war.

Warsaw leveled once in my lifetime and that's enough."

I've seen
5

Other Polish dissidents feel that the Czechoslovak
experience must not hinder their efforts to pressure the Gierek
regime to continue its policies of liberalization in Poland.
of the dissidents, Jacek Huron, states the following:

One
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Our country's representatives should come to
an understanding directly with the Soviet government
as to the limits of the reforms (in Poland).
We
mustn't let ourselves be haunted by Czechoslovakia's
experience and believe that these limits have been
drawn once and for all.
If there is no force within
the government capable of undertaking such a dialogue,
then social movements— -at present marginal— could
help make the change by the influence and pressure .g
they can bring to bear on the established hierarchy.
Perspectives
If a Polish insurrection were to occur, however improbable
given the fear of Soviet military intervention, it appears
reasonable to assume that the Czechs would not support it.

It is

simply not within the Czech national character to rise up in violent
revolt against an oppressive government because the Czechs have
consistently resorted to passive resistance and devious maneuver
ing.

The Poles have always looked upon the Czech national

preference for passivity with contempt.
Furthermore, the Czechs enjoy a standard of living 20 to
25 percent higher than that of the Poles.

The higher standard of

living in Czechoslovakia has contributed to a certain stability in
that country.

Economic stability in Czechoslovakia precluded a

revolt in 1956, while neighboring Poland and Hungary erupted into
violence.

The 1970 and 1976 Polish riots, both provoked by economic

catalysts, appear to have initiated no sympathy among the Czechs.
A repeat of the 1956 events when the Hungarians, linked by
a long tradition of friendship with the Poles, rose up .in revolt in
mutual support of the Poles, seems highly unlikely in the case of
the Czechs and the Poles.

Czech support of a potential Polish
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insurrection appears to be improbable because Czech-Polish friend
ship simply does not exist.
One other factor must be considered, the resolution of
Czech and Slovak animosity.

Czech-Slovak conflicts, which helped

to destroy the First Czechoslovak Republic in 1959 and to trigger
the "Prague Spring" in 1968, have been resolved.

As of January 1,

1 9 6 9 , the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is a federal state.

Czechs

no longer dominate the Slovak bureaucracy or control Slovak affairs
from Prague as were the cases under the First Republic and the
i 960 Constitution.

Furthermore, the invasion of Czechoslovakia

contributed to a solidarity between the two peoples'which had not
previously existed.

Therefore, it appears unlikely that Slovak

nationalism v/ill contribute to further discord within the Czecho
slovak Socialist Republic.
Based upon the preceding analysis of such factors as
traditional Czech-Polish hostility and mutual cultural prejudice,.
Polish participation in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, and
the higher standard of living in Czechoslovakia compared to that of
Poland, one can assume that the Czechs would not support an initial
Polish insurrection.

Moreover, excellent Czech-Polish relations

within the economic sphere have not led to political integration
between Czechoslovakia and Poland as is evidenced in the third
chapter of this study.

Czech-Polish antagonisms have remained

intact to this day.
The historical animosities between the Czechs and the Poles
are the tragedy of Eastern Europe because the Czechs and the Poles
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are two of the region's most powerful and influential nations.
Their mutual cultural prejudices, hostilities, and indifference have
guaranteed Soviet hegemony in Czechoslovakia and in Poland.

The

tragedy of the Czechs and the Poles is the tragedy of all of the
peoples of Eastern Europe.

NOTES:
^Adam ■Brorake and John W. Strong, Gierek's Poland
Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1973), PP» 1-3*

(New York

2

Ibid. , pp. 4 l , 48; Manuel .Lucbert, "New aspirations and
reshuffled priorities," The Guardian
(July 12, 1975), p. 3; Andre
Fontaine, "Gierek looks West," The Guardian
(January 11, 1975),
p. 15.
■^"1000 Dub£ek backers may be interned during party congress
The Times (London)
(April 6 , 1971), p. 8 .
4

Hella Pick, "Bondage with a human face," The Guardian
(May 30, 1976), p. 9 .
5

Henry Muller,
8 , 1976) , p. 6 9 .

"The Winter of Discontent," Time

^Manuel Lucbert, "Polish dissident's hope:
within,"' The Guardian
(May 30, 1976), p. 9*

(November

reform from

APPENDIX A
THE FULL TEXT OF CHARTER 77*
Law No. 120 of the Czechoslovak Collection of Laws, published
on October 13, 1976, incltidea the text of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both signed on behalf of our
republic in 1968 and confirmed at the 1975 Helsinki Conference.
These pacts went into effect in our country on March 23, 1976:

since

that date our citizens have had the right, and the state has had
the duty, to abide by them.
The freedoms guaranteed to individuals by the two documents
are important assets of civilisation.

They have been the goals of

campaigns by many progressive people in the past, and their enact
ment can significantly contribute to a humane development of our
society.

We welcome the fact that the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic

has agreed to enter into these covenants.
Their publication, however, is at the same time an urgent
reminder of the many fundamental human rights that regrettably exist
in our country only on paper.

The right of free expression guaran

teed by Article 19 of the first pact, for example, is quite illu
sory.

Tens of thousands of citizens have been prevented from

working in their professions for the sole reason that their views
differ from the official ones.

They have been the frequent targets

of various forms of discrimination and chicanery on.the part of the
*From "Czechoslovak Charter 77~-the full text," The Guardian
(February 1.3, 197?), p. 9*
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authorities or social organisations;

they have been denied any

opportunity to defend themselves and are practically the victims of
apartheid.

Hundreds of thousands of other citizens have.been

denied the "freedom from fear" cited in the preamble of the first
pactr

they live in constant peril of losing their jobs or other

benefits if they express their opinions.
Contrary to Article 13 of the second pact, guaranteeing the
right to education, many young people are prevented from pursuing
higher education because of their views or even because of their
parents* views.

Countless citizens worry that if they declare

their convictions, they themselves or their children will be deprived
of an education.
Exercising the right to "seek, receive and impart informa
tion regardless of frontiers and of whether it is oral, written or
printed," or "imparted through art"— Point 2, Article 13 of the first
pact— can result in persecution not only outside the court but also
inside.

Frequently this occurs under the pretext of a criminal

indictment (as evidenced, among other instances, by the recent trial
of young musicians).
Freedom of speech is suppressed by the government's manage
ment of all mass media, incliiding the publishing and cultural
institutions.

No political, philosophical, scientific or artistic

work that deviates in the slightest from the narrow framework of
official ideology or aesthetics is permitted to be produced.
criticism of social conditions is prohibited.

Public

Public defense

•against false and defamatory charges by official propaganda organs
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is impossible despite the legal protection against attacks on one's
reputation and honour unequivocally afforded by Article 17 of the
first pact.

False accusations cannot be refuted, and it is futile

to attempt rectification or to seek legal redress.

Open discussion

of intellectual and cultural matters is out of the question.

Many

scientific and cultural workers as well as other citizens have been
discriminated against simply because some years ago they legally
published or openly articulated views condemned by the current
political power.
Religious freedom, emphatically guaranteed by Article l8
of the first pact, is systematically curbed with a despotic
arbitrariness:

limits are imposed on the activities of priests

who are constantly threatened with the revocation of government
permission to perform their function; persons who manifest their
religious faith either by word or action lose their jobs or are
made to suffer other repressions; religious instruction in schools
is suppressed, etc.
A whole range of civil rights is severely restricted or
completely suppressed by the effective method of subordinating all
institutions and organisations in the state to the political
directives of the ruling party's apparatuses and the pronouncements
of highly influential individuals.

Neither the constitution of

the &SSR nor any of the country's other legal procedures regulate
the contents, form or application of such pronouncements, which
are frequently issued orally, unbeknown to and beyond the control
of the average citizen.
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Their authors are responsible only to themselves and their
own hierarchy, yet they have a decisive influence on the activity
of the legislative as well as executive bodies of the state admini
stration, on the courts,

trade unions, social organisations, other

political parties, business, factories, schools and similar
installations, and their orders take precedence over the laws.
If some organisations or citizens, in the interpretation
of their rights and duties, become involved in a conflict with the
directives, they cannot turn to a neutral authority for none exists.
Consequently, the right of assembly and the prohibition of its
restraint, stemming from Articles 21 and 22 of the first pact; the
right to participate in public affairs, in Article 25; and the
right to equality before the law, in Article 26— all have been
seriously curtailed.
These conditions prevent working people from freely
establishing labour and other organisations for the protection of
their economic and social interests, and from freely using their
right to strike as provided in Point 1, Article 8 of the second
pact.
Other civil rights, including the virtual banning of "wil
ful interference with private life, the family, home, and corres
pondence" in Article 1? of the first pact, are gravely circum
scribed by the fact that the Interior Ministry employs various
practices to control the daily existence of citizens— such as
telephone tapping and the surveillance of private homes, watching
mail, shadowing individuals, searching apartments, and recruiting
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a network of informers from the ranks of the population (often byillegal intimidation, or, sometimes, promises), etc.
The ministry frequently interferes in the decisions.of
employers, inspires discrimination by authorities and organisations,
influences the organs of justice, and even supervises the
propaganda campaigns of the mass media.

This activity is not

regulated by laws, it is covert, so the citizen is unable to
protect himself against it.
In the cases of politically motivated persecution, the
organs of interrogation and justice violate the rights of the
defendants and their counsel, contrary to Article'll of the first
pact as well as Czechoslovakia's own laws.

People thus sentenced

to jail are being treated in a manner that violates their human
dignity, impairs their health, and attempts to break them morally.
Point 2, Article 12 of the first pact, guaranteeing the
right to freely leave one's country, is generally violated.

Under

the pretext of "protecting the state security," contained in Point
3, departure is tied to various illegal conditions.

Just as

arbitrary are the procedures for issuing visas to foreign nationals,
many of whom are prevented from visiting Czechoslovakia because they
had some official or friendly contact with persons who had been
discriminated against in our country.
Some citizens— privately at their places of work, or through
the media abroad (the only public forum available to them)-— have
drawn attention to these systematic violations of human rights and
democratic freedoms and have demanded a remedy in specific cases.
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But they have received no response, or have themselves become the
objects of investigation.

The responsibility for the preservation of civil rights
naturally/rests with the state power.

But not on it alone.

Every

individual bears a share of responsibility for the general
conditions in the country, and therefore also for compliance with
the enacted pacts, which are as binding for the people as for the
government.
The feeling of this co-responsibility, the be l i e f 'in the
value of civic engagement and the readiness to be engaged, together
with the need to seek a new and more effective expression, gave us
the idea of creating Charter 77, whose existence we publicly
announce.
Charter 77 is a free and informal and open association of
people of various convictions, religions and professions, linked by
the desire to work individually and collectively for respect for
human and civil rights in Czechoslovakia and the world— the rights
provided for in the enacted international pacts, in the Final Act
of the Helsinki Conference, and in numerous other international
documents against wars, violence and social and mental oppression.

It represents a'general declaration of human rights.
Charter 77 is founded on the concepts of solidarity and
friendship of people, who share a concern for the fate of ideals to
which they have linked their lives and work.
Charter 77 is not an organisation; it has no statutes,
permanent organs or registered membership.

Everyone who agrees with
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its idea and participates in its work and supports it,, belongs to
it.
Charter 77 is not intended to be a basis for opposition
political activity.

Its desire is to serve the common interest,

as have numerous similar organisations of civic initiative.
and West.

East

It has no intention of initiating its own programmes

for political or social reforms or changes, but it wants to lead
in the sphere of its activity by means of a constructive, dialogue
with the political and state authorities— and particularly by
drawing attention to various specific violations of civil and human
rights, by preparing their documentation, by suggesting solutions,
by submitting various more-general proposals aimed at furthering
these rights and their guarantees, by acting as a mediator in the
event of conflict which might result in wrong-doings, etc.
By its symbolic name, Charter 77 stresses that it has been

established on the threshold of what has been declared the year of
political prisoners, in the course of which a meeting in Belgrade
is to review the progress— or lack of it— achieved since the
Helsinki Conference.
As signatories of this declaration, we designate Dr. Jan

Patocka, Dr. Vaclav Havel and Professor Jiri Hajek to act as spokes
men for Charter 77.

These spokesmen are authorised to represent

Charter 77 before the state and other organisations, as well as
before the public at home and throughout the world, and, they
guarantee the authenticity of the documents by their signatures.
In us and other citizens, who will join Charter 77, they will find
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their collaborators who will participate in the necessary
negotiations, who will accept partial tasks, and will share the
entire responsibility.
We trust that Charter 77 will contribute to making it
possible for all citizens of Czechoslovakia to live and work as
free people.

APPENDIX B
THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE*
In connection with the events in Czechoslovakia, the ques
tion of the relationship and interconnection between the socialist
countries' national interests and their internationalist obligations
has.assumed'particular urgency and sharpness.

The measures taken

jointly by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to defend
the socialist gains of the Czechoslovak people are of enormous
significance for strengthening the socialist commonwealth, which is
the main achievement of the international working class.
At the same time it is impossible to ignore the allegations
being heard in

some places that the actions of the five socialist

countries contradict the Marxist-Leninist principle of sovereignty
and the right of the nations to self-determination.
Such arguments are untenable primarily because they are
based on an abstract, non-class approach to the question of sover
eignty

and the right of nations to self-determination.
There

is no doubt that the peoples of the. socialist countrie

and the Communist parties have and must have freedom to determine
their country's path of development.

However, any decision of

theirs must damage neither socialism in their own country nor the
worldwide workers' movement which is waging a struggle for socialism.
*

•
.

From "Sovereignty and International Duties of Socialist
Countries," Pravda (September 25» 1968) as cited in Ducha^ek, Ivo,
Nations and Men (Hinsdale, 111.: The Dryden Press, 1975) » P« ;+2A.

lo8
The sovereignty of each socialist country cannot be opposed
to the world of socialism, of the world revolutionary movement,

..

As a social system, world socialism is the common gain of the
working people of all lands; it is indivisible and its defense is
the common cause of all Communists,

The weakening of any link in

the world socialist system has a direct effect on all the socialist
countries which cannot be indifferent.

Thus, the antisocialist

forces in Czechoslovakia were in.essence using talk about the
right to self-determination to cover up demands for so-called
neutrality and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic’s withdrawal
from the socialist commonwealth.

But implementation of such

"self-determination," e. g . , Czechoslovakia's separation from the
socialist commonwealth, would run counter to Czechoslovakia's
fundamental interests and would harm the other socialist countries.
Such "self-determination," as a result of which NATO troops might
approach Soviet borders and the commonwealth of European socialist
countries could be dismembered, in fact infringes on the vital
interest of these countries' peoples, and fundamentally contradicts
the right of these peoples to socialist self-determination,

...

Those who speak of the "illegality" of the allied socialist
countries' actions in Czechoslovakia forget that in a class society
there is and can be no such thing as non-class law.

Laws and norms

of law are subordinated to the laws of the class struggle and the
laws of social development.

. . .

.
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